

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP77M00144R001100190023-8

94TH CONGRESS }
1st Session }

SENATE

{ REPORT
No. 94-00

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
FILE COPY

DISAPPROVING CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 160]

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE



JUNE 18, 1975.—Ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

38-008

WASHINGTON : 1975

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP77M00144R001100190023-8

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, *Chairman*

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri	STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington	JOHN TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada	BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, New Hampshire	WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia	ROBERT TAFT, Jr., Ohio
SAM NUNN, Georgia	DEWEY F. BARTLETT, Oklahoma
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa	
GARY HART, Colorado	
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont	

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*

JOHN T. TICER, *Chief Clerk*

Calendar No. 199

94TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

REPORT
No. 94-202

DISAPPROVING CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

JUNE 18 (legislative day JUNE 6), 1975.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. STENNIS, from the Committee on Armed Services,
submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 160]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 160), to disapprove construction projects on the island of Diego Garcia, having considered the same, reports adversely thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolution not be agreed to.

PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

Section 613 of Public Law 93-552 contains special language concerning construction on Diego Garcia; it requires that before any funds are obligated to accomplish construction on Diego Garcia, the President must certify as to the necessity for the construction and wait 60 days during which time either House of Congress may introduce a resolution of disapproval. The President certified as to the necessity for the construction on May 12, 1975, and Senator Mansfield introduced Senate Resolution 160, disapproving the construction of Diego Garcia on May 19, 1975.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee held public hearings on June 10, 1975, taking testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a State Department representative. Subsequently, there was an exchange of questions and answers based on classified information. The Committee met in executive session on June 17, 1975 to consider the issues and act on the resolution.

In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 as amended, there is set forth below the committee vote on the motion to favorably report this resolution, S. Res. 160.

Those voting in favor of the Resolution to prevent construction at

Diego Garcia: Senators Symington, McIntyre, Culver, Hart of Colo., Leahy, and Scott of Va.

Those voting in opposition to the Resolution to prevent construction at Diego Garcia: Senators Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of Va., Nunn, Thurmond, Tower, Goldwater, Taft and Bartlett.

Vote: Six in favor, ten opposed. The motion failed.

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE POSITION

Since the United States has vital interests in the Indian Ocean area and plays a major role in maintaining stability in that area, the Committee felt the United States should immediately proceed with construction of facilities at Diego Garcia. This modest expansion would most appropriately provide the United States with an improved capability to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

BACKGROUND

General

Diego Garcia is an atoll located within the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean approximately 1,000 miles due south of the tip of India. The heavily vegetated island consists of 6,700 acres with average elevations from three to seven feet. It is horseshoe-shaped with a forty mile perimeter. The enclosed lagoon is 5½ miles wide by 13 miles long, with depths ranging from 30 to 100 feet. Annual rainfall is approximately 100 inches. The island has no indigenous population.


Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago belong to a group of islands in the Indian Ocean, collectively known as the British Indian Ocean Territory over which the United Kingdom exercises sovereignty. The United States is specifically authorized to use Diego Garcia under the terms of two Agreements, executed on December 30, 1966, "to meet the needs of both Governments for defense," and on October 24, 1972, more specifically to agree "to the construction of a limited naval communications facility . . .".

History of U.S. Presence

The United States began negotiation with the British Government in 1966 for a lease to establish a communications station and an operational base on Diego Garcia. This base was to be an austere logistical support activity which would serve mainly as a refueling stop for units operating in the Indian Ocean. These negotiations were consummated in the 1966 Agreement mentioned above which granted the United States base rights for a period of 50 years with an option to renew for 20 years.

A request for the first increment of construction funds to provide the proposed logistical facility was submitted by the Navy to the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1970 construction request. This request was approved by the House and the Senate in the authorizing legislation. The House Appropriations Committee also approved the appropriation of funds for the facility, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not and the funds were deleted by the Appropriations conference. The arguments offered by the Senate Appropriation Committee for withholding Diego Garcia construction funds were essentially the same as they are today.

In Fiscal Year 1971, the Navy again asked for funds for Diego Garcia, but reduced the scope to a "limited communications facility." This request was approved by Congress and the construction for the communications facility is essentially complete.



Recent Legislative History

The Navy renewed its efforts to get Congressional approval to build a fleet support facility by requesting \$29 million in the Fiscal Year 1974 Supplemental Authorization Bill. The \$29 million would provide facilities with a capacity to support a carrier task force. The Supplemental request was approved by the House, disapproved by the Senate, and deferred without prejudice by the conferees, anticipating a more complete examination of the request with the Fiscal Year 1975 Bill.

The Fiscal Year 1975 Construction Authorization Bill as submitted by the Administration contained \$29 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force to construct the Diego Garcia logistical facility. The House Armed Services Committee approved the request as submitted and the Senate Armed Services Committee reduced the Navy authorization to \$14.8 million, left the Air Force authorization at \$3.3 million, and inserted qualifying language in its Committee Report as follows:

(Ref., p. 7, Senate Report No. 93-1136 accompanying H.R. 16136.)

After careful consideration of the many factors involved and thorough debate, the Committee approved \$14,802,000 as a first increment of the Navy's requirement, and the \$3.3 million requested by the Air Force.

At the same time, the Committee included Section 612 in the bill to preclude the obligation of any of these funds until the President of the United States has advised the Congress in writing that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for these facilities and has certified that this construction is essential to the national interest. Such certification must be submitted to the Congress and approved by both Houses of Congress. This will assure the opportunity for full debate on the expansion at Diego Garcia as a policy matter, and in light of the most recent circumstances.

Because of the importance and complexity of the issues raised by Diego Garcia, the Committee felt that it was important for the new Administration to make a full reevaluation of this matter. It is the hope of the Committee that such an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interest in the area of the Indian Ocean.

The conference agreed to authorize \$14.8 million for the Navy and \$3.3 million for the Air Force with the following qualifying language which appears in Public Law 93-552:

SEC. 613. (a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act with respect to any construction project at Diego Garcia may be obligated unless—

(1) the President has (A) advised the Congress in writing that all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia have been evaluated by him, and (B) certified to the Congress in writing that the construction of any such project is essential to the national interest of the United States;

(2) 60 days of continuous session of the Congress have expired following the date on which certification with respect to such project is received by the Congress, and

(3) neither House of Congress has adopted, within such 60-day period, a resolution disapproving such project.

(b) (1) For purposes of this section, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of such 60-day period.

(2) For purposes of this section, "resolution" means a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Senate does not approve the proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia, the need for which was certified to by the President and the certification with respect to which was received by the Senate on May 12.", the first and second blanks being filled with the name of the resolving House and the third blank being filled with the appropriate date.

(c) Subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section are enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions described by subsection (b) (2) of this section; and they supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(d) A resolution with respect to a proposed construction project of the island of Diego Garcia shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(e) (1) If the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate to which a resolution with respect to a proposed construction project on the island of Diego Garcia has been referred has not reported such resolution at the end of 20 calendar days after its introduction, not counting any day which is excluded under subsection (b) (1) of this section, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any other resolution introduced with respect to the same proposed construction project which has been referred to the committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in order after the committee has reported a resolution of disapproval with respect to the same proposed construction project.

(2) A motion to discharge under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be made only by a Senator favoring the resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, the time to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amend-

ment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(f) (1) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a resolution shall be privileged. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(2) Debate in the Senate on a resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with a resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.

(4) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a resolution is in order in the Senate.

The conferees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees took the following action:

The conferees agreed to delete all funds specifically earmarked for the construction of facilities on Diego Garcia; however, that action was agreed upon with the clear understanding that if neither House adopts a resolution of disapproval, in accordance with the provisions of section 613 of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975, for the construction of any facility requested for Diego Garcia, any construction funds available to the Navy and the Air Force in the appropriations act may be utilized by the Navy and the Air Force to carry out the construction project.

The Fiscal Year 1976 Military Construction Authorization request contains an additional \$13.8 million as the second increment of the Navy expansion effort. The Senate Armed Services Committee retained that authorization contingent upon the action taken by the Congress as required by the 1975 Military Construction Act.

On May 12, 1975, President Ford sent the certification required by the Fiscal Year 1975 Act. That certification reads as follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Act, 1975 (Public Law 93-552), I have evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia. On

the basis of this evaluation and in accordance with section 613(a)(1)(B), I hereby certify that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 12, 1975.

On May 19, 1975, Senator Mansfield introduced Senate Resolution 160 disapproving the construction at Diego Garcia. This resolution was referred to the Armed Services Committee which has until June 18, 1975 to act on the Resolution in accordance with the provisions of the Fiscal Year 1975 Military Construction Act.

On May 23, 1975, the following justification for the Presidential certification was provided:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 23, 1975.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 13, the President sent to the Congress a message concerning his determination, in accordance with Section 613(a)(1)(A) of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1975, that the construction of United States facilities on Diego Garcia is essential to the national interest of the United States.

I am pleased to transmit to you today the attached supporting justification which has also been approved by the President. I hope it will be of assistance to the Senate in its consideration of this important legislation.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF,
Assistant to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITED SUPPORT FACILITIES ON DIEGO
GARCIA

In 1966, the United States signed an agreement with the British Government providing that the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory would be available for 50 years to meet the defense purposes of both governments. In this context, we concluded in 1972 an Administrative Agreement providing for the establishment of a limited communications station on the small atoll of Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean. In February 1974, an agreement was negotiated *ad referendum* to replace the 1972 agreements and to provide for the construction and operation of a proposed support facility. The British Government announced in December 1974 its agreement with our proposal to expand the facility.

The United States has an important interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean area. In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area is essential to the economic well-being of modern industrial societies. It is essential that the United States maintain and periodically demonstrate a capability to operate military forces in the Indian Ocean. Such exercise of our right to navigate freely on the high seas communicates to others the importance we attach to the stability of the region and to continued free access by all nations.

The credibility of any US military presence ultimately depends on the ability of our forces to function efficiently and effectively in a wide range of circumstances. Currently, the US logistics facility closest to the western Indian Ocean is in the Philippines, 4,000 miles away. At a time when access to regional fuel supplies and other support is subject to the uncertainties of political developments, the establishment of modest support facilities on Diego Garcia is essential to insure the proper flexibility and responsiveness of US forces to national requirements in a variety of possible contingencies. The alternative would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval tankers and other mobile logistics forces.

Objections have been raised to this proposal on the grounds that it will prompt an increase in the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and give rise to an arms race in the region. Clearly, both we and the Soviets are aware of the military presence of other nations, but it would be incorrect to assume that Soviet actions are determined exclusively by the level or nature of our force presence. The growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of their own national interests—including the continuing expansion of the Soviet Navy in a global “blue water” role—rather than to US force presence as such.

A distinction must also be drawn between facilities and force presence. The proposed construction on Diego Garcia would enhance our capability to provide support to US forces operating in the Indian Ocean. However, there is no intent to permanently station operational units there, and the installation would not imply an increase in the level of US forces deployed to that region. We have, on several occasions, expressed our willingness to consider constructive proposals for arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we do not believe that construction on Diego Garcia should be contingent upon the outcome of discussions on such proposals. In our view, these are two separate issues.

The Diego Garcia proposal has been criticized by a number of regional states which favor the concept of a special legal regime limiting the presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions adopted in the United Nations General Assembly. United States policy has consistently been to oppose measures that would constitute an unacceptable depar-

ture from customary international law concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas.

We are aware of the concern expressed by some states of the region, but we do not share their conviction that the construction of support facilities on Diego Garcia will result in an arms race or that these facilities will somehow represent a threat to their interests. On the contrary, it is our belief that such facilities will contribute to the maintenance of healthy balance essential to the preservation of regional security and stability. It is our considered judgment that the legitimate differences in perspective between ourselves and certain other nations with respect to Diego Garcia are susceptible to reasoned discussion within a framework of mutual respect and need not inhibit the development of satisfactory relations with the states of the region.

Administration's Request

Today Diego Garcia exists as a limited communications station. It has an 8,000 foot runway and a dredged turning basin in the lagoon to permit logistical support of the communications station. At the present time there are about 430 U.S. personnel regularly assigned to the communications site. The British maintain a contingent of approximately 20 military on the island representing the Government of the United Kingdom.

Listed below are the projects by Fiscal Year sponsoring Service that the Department of Defense proposes for Diego Garcia:

<i>Service/Project</i>	<i>Fiscal year 1975</i>	<i>Cost in thousands</i>
Navy:		
POL storage (320,000 barrels) -----		\$5,492
Pier -----		4,000
Runway extension/parking apron -----		3,500
Powerplant expansion -----		1,165
Substation -----		292
Subsistence building addition -----		393
Subtotal -----		<u>14,802</u>
Air Force:		
Aircraft parking area (25,000 sq yds) -----		1,000
POL storage, JP-4 (180,000 barrels) -----		1,800
Open ammunition protective storage -----		500
Subtotal -----		<u>3,300</u>
Total, fiscal year 1975 -----		<u>18,102</u>

<i>Fiscal year 1976</i>	
Navy:	
POL storage (180,000) -----	1,530
Powerplant expansion -----	1,254
Aircraft parking apron/runway extension -----	1,173
Hangar -----	572
Operation building addition -----	265
Airfield transit storage -----	160
BEQ—277 men -----	4,325
BOQ—32 men -----	1,550

Navy—continued

Fiscal year 1976—continued


	Cost in thousands
Ready issue ammunition magazine	\$251
Cold storage	581
General warehouse	713
Receiver building addition	149
Amphibious vehicle hardstand	46
Aircraft arresting gear	245
Utilities distribution system	927
Radio and TV station	109
 Total, fiscal year 1976	 13,800

Fiscal year 1977

Navy: Various facilities ¹ (total, fiscal year 1977)	5,900
 Grand total	 37,802

¹ The precise facilities to be constructed have not been determined but for the most part they are troop support facilities (such as: chapel, club, recreational facilities, hobby shop, theater, library, etc.) that would be required to support the communications site even if there were no expansion.

In essence, the Administration would like for Diego Garcia to serve as an outpost base where ships may perform limited in-port upkeep, receive periodic repair services from a tender and receive critical supplies via Air Force airlift. Diego Garcia would also serve as a base for patrol aircraft providing air surveillance support to the ships in the Indian Ocean. This expansion in capability would increase the number of personnel permanently assigned to about 600.



The major planned improvements are:

(1) An anchorage which is capable of mooring a six-ship carrier task force. This will require lagoon dredging with the anchorage sized to permit ship to ship transfer of explosive ordnance.

(2) *A fuel and general purpose pier* capable of loading and unloading a 180,000 barrel tanker in 24 hours.

(3) *Fuel storage* capacity of 640,000 barrels. This storage is sufficient to support short notice deployment of forces in the Indian Ocean until a tanker pipeline independent of Middle East sources can be established; or support deployment of reinforcements in the event of hostilities until pipelines can be increased; and provide accessible fuel support to combat forces to accommodate unforeseen fluctuations in fuel availability. The capacity planned would sustain a typical Indian Ocean carrier task force for about 28 days. There is also some provision for Air Force contingency needs.

(4) *Improvements to the existing runway* which will permit aerial resupply for the task group, basing of patrol aircraft and recovery of tactical jet aircraft in emergencies. A 4,000-foot extension (providing a total runway length of 12,000 feet) will provide for the safe recovery of tactical jet aircraft under a range of adverse conditions and will accommodate KC-135 resupply and refueling aircraft.

(5) *Aircraft maintenance* capability to include a maintenance hangar, parking area, and an aircraft wash rack.

(6) *Ammunition storage* capacity to handle anti-submarine warfare and other ordnance as well as some open storage for contingency munitions.

(7) *Additional aircraft parking apron* to accommodate an additional C-141 (two can be accommodated now), four anti-submarine aircraft, one carrier command and control aircraft, and twenty carrier tactical aircraft. There will also be 25,000 square yards for Air Force contingencies.

(8) *Other airfield improvements* to include an addition to the operations building to handle the patrol mission, an air cargo transit shed and a fire station.

(9) *Additions to the personnel support complex* in the form of another 277-man bachelor enlisted quarters, a 32-man bachelor officer's quarters, and an addition to the dining facility.

(10) *Additional general storage capability.*

(11) *Power plant expansion* adding two 1200 KW diesel electric generators to accommodate the added load (there are five 1200 KW generators there now).

U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT

As mentioned previously, the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia is specifically covered in two Agreements with the United Kingdom. The first, executed in 1966, is a general agreement that the U.S. may use the island for defense purposes. The 1972 agreement is quite specific on the scope and purpose of the limited communications station.

Negotiations were begun with the British in February 1974, to derive a new Agreement that would specifically cover the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. These negotiations resulted in agreed ad referendum texts of an exchange of

notes that would supercede the Diego Garcia Agreement 1972, together with a supplementary exchange of letters concerning planned construction, and a service level implementing arrangement. Shortly after ad referendum agreement was reached, the Labor Party formed a new government in the United Kingdom. Following the completion of the British Defense Review on December 3, 1974, Mr. Roy Mason, United Kingdom Minister of Defense, as part of his statement before Parliament, said :

Given the effects of these decisions in the Indian Ocean area and the Soviet Naval presence there, we have decided to agree to proposals from the United States Government for a relatively modest expansion of the facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia which they enjoy, jointly with us, under an existing Agreement with Her Majesty's Government. Their use of the facilities other than for routine purposes would however be a matter of joint decision of the two Governments. We and the United States Government have also agreed to pursue consultations with the aim of developing realistic progress towards arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

However, the ad referendum agreement has not been signed and probably will not be signed until the United States Congress completes action on this issue.

COMMITTEE POSITION

The Committee agreed that the United States should have the capability to maintain a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and that construction of facilities at Diego Garcia would most appropriately provide such a capability. Thus the Committee felt that construction of facilities at Diego Garcia was in the U.S. national interest and should begin immediately.

In reaching this conclusion, the Committee emphasized that the United States has vital national interests in the Indian Ocean and must be prepared to counter the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Construction of the proposed facilities in the Indian Ocean would contribute to both the protection of U.S. interests and the maintenance of stability.

1. The U.S. has vital interests in the Indian Ocean area

The United States and the other industrialized nations of the world depend heavily on the Indian Ocean sea lanes that lead from the vast natural resources of Africa, India and the Middle East. This reliance can be most readily illustrated by a few facts concerning oil. More than two-thirds of the known reserves of crude oil in the world are found in the Middle East and Africa. Today, approximately twenty percent of the crude oil that the United States imports comes from the Middle East; Europe is seventy-five percent dependent on Middle East oil and Japan eighty-five percent dependent. The oil embargo in the Fall of 1973 provided a warning of the consequences that would result from a loss of imported crude oil. At any one time, fifty percent of the sea borne oil is in transit on the Indian Ocean sea lanes. The United States and the remainder of the industrialized free world cannot afford to let any nation restrict those Indian Ocean sea lanes.

2. Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has steadily grown

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean has gradually increased by one or two ships per year in the past few years. They now maintain a force of 15-20 ships of which half can be classified as combatants. The United States maintains a small task force on station in the Indian Ocean about one-third of the year and in addition has three ships stationed permanently at Bahrain.

Very recently the Soviet Union has greatly increased its *capability* to operate in the Indian Ocean. First, the Suez Canal has been re-opened, and second, the Soviet Union is nearing the completion of a naval support facility at Berbera, Somalia, that includes a major runway, housing for 1,500 personnel and a missile storage and repair facility. The expansion at Diego Garcia would provide the United States a comparable *capability* to sustain naval operations in the Indian Ocean area, and the Committee is convinced that it is necessary to counter the increased Soviet capability and to maintain the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

3. The construction of modest logistical facilities at Diego Garcia is a prudent action

The U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia are strictly support in nature. The Navy has indicated that no further construction of facilities at Diego Garcia beyond those presently requested will be necessary.

The expanded fuel storage requested for Diego Garcia will increase U.S. operating flexibility in the Indian Ocean by providing contingency support for U.S. naval force operating in the area. In the absence of Diego Garcia the nearest independent U.S. fuel supply is now 4,000 miles away at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The relatively limited expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia will be very low political and military profile by virtue of Diego Garcia's location, lack of indigenous population, and its British sovereignty. At the same time it will strengthen our signal to the rest of the world that we do have vested interests in the area of the Indian Ocean and are prepared to protect those interests.

It has been argued that the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia will lead to an arms race in the Indian Ocean; the Committee does not agree. The proposed logistical facilities at Diego Garcia provide merely an improved capability for U.S. deployments in the Indian Ocean. The deployments themselves will depend on developments in the area, particularly the level of Soviet naval activity. Moreover, past experience indicated that Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean will proceed regardless of U.S. restraint. During the last year when the United States suspended all construction of facilities at Diego Garcia, the Soviet Union substantially expanded their "presence" at Berbera.

The Committee is sympathetic to the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. However, the Committee does not believe that a zone of peace can be achieved through unilateral U.S. restraint.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON

In our Report on Military Construction for Fiscal Year 1975 we noted that the serious defense and foreign policy questions related to the Administration's request for expanding the facility at Diego Garcia required further consideration.

We included Section 613 in the Military Construction Bill to postpone the obligation of funds for Diego Garcia until the President had advised the Congress in writing that this construction was essential to the national interest; and we urged the Administration to make a "thorough exploration of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean."

At our recent hearing on June 10, we asked the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, Mr. George Vest, whether any effort had been made to initiate with the Soviet Union a discourse on the possibility of mutual arms restraint. His answer was "no".

The nations in the Indian Ocean region have repeatedly urged adoption of the concept that this ocean be treated as a "zone of peace". And several resolutions to this effect have been passed in the United Nations.

President Ford himself, in his letter to the Congress on May 23, noted that the Diego Garcia project "has been criticized by a number of regional states which favor the concept of a special legal regime limiting the presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions adopted in the United States General Assembly."

In the same letter, President Ford observed that United States policy has been to oppose such measures because they "would constitute an unacceptable departure from customary international law concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas." And at our hearing on June 10, Mr. Vest gave a similar explanation.

This interpretation of American interest in freedom of the seas as precluding negotiations to achieve a "zone of peace" or arms restraint in the Indian Ocean is difficult to understand. It seems almost unconscienable that our nation would pass up the opportunity to prevent a needless and costly naval competition in a far-away ocean under the pretext of protecting "customary international law concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas."

Regarding the alleged Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean, it is true that the Soviet Union has gradually expanded its presence in this ocean; but this presence, including the reported facility at Berbera, is very limited and provides no major challenge to the American, French and British forces in the area which collectively are much stronger than the Soviets and have access to a greater number of ports. Indeed the French alone have a greater number of combatant

ships permanently deployed in the Indian Ocean, as well as a greater number of port facilities, than any other power.

By voting in favor of the Mansfield "Disapproving Resolution" on Diego Garcia, S. 160, we can send the Administration a clear message that the Congress expects some serious efforts to gain an agreement on mutual restraint in the Indian Ocean.

We can always escalate, but the opportunity for negotiation should not now be bypassed.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROBERT TAFT

I voted with the Committee to disapprove Senate Resolution 160, thus voting to permit the expenditure of funds for the establishment of a fleet support facility on Diego Garcia.

However, I wish to note that I support the construction of the Diego Garcia facility only as a logistical convenience for the Navy. I neither imply nor support any implication that the construction of this facility constitutes a United States' commitment to become the main counterbalancing power against Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The only significant reason for any non-littoral Power to be interested in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean is because of the oil imported from that area. In fact, however, the United States imports comparatively little oil from the Persian Gulf states. In 1974, only 8% of the petroleum products consumed by the United States came from Persian Gulf states. While it would be highly inconvenient if we were deprived of the imports from that area, it would not be catastrophic.

As the Department of Defense noted in response to a question of mine, "It is true that the European nations are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than is the United States." In 1972, the Common Market imported 62% of its total consumption from the Persian Gulf—again, compared to 8% for the United States in 1974. It therefore follows that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are fundamentally European, not American, areas of concern.

The European nations, led by France, recognize this fact. Since 1970 French naval ship-days in the Indian Ocean have consistently been superior to Soviet ship-days; that continues to be the case for the first half of 1975. The French forces at times include an aircraft carrier, a type of ship the Soviets do not yet possess. If British forces deployed in the area are added to the French, their total ship-days outnumber the Soviets heavily.

The Europeans are fully capable, militarily, of balancing the growing Soviet power in the Indian Ocean. France possess a large, modern, and powerful navy; the French today have two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, fifty-two anti-submarine frigates and corvettes, and nineteen attack submarines. French plans call for the construction, by 1985, of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, two nuclear-powered helicopter carriers, thirty frigates and corvettes, and twenty attack submarines, some of which will be nuclear powered.

Great Britain also possess a large fleet, consisting of an aircraft carrier, twelve cruisers, sixty-one frigates, and twenty-nine attack submarines, seven of which are nuclear powered. Other European nations possess smaller but also modern and useful navies.

The opening of the Suez Canal is as great a help to the Europeans, in terms of deploying ships into the Indian Ocean, as it is to the Soviets. The French are currently re-basing both of their aircraft carriers from Brest, in the Atlantic, to Toulon, in the Mediterranean.

The Europeans also possess an extensive network of naval bases in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The French have bases at Diego Suarez, Djibouti, Reunion Island, and in the Comoro Islands. Britain has bases at Gan Island and on Mauritius.

I believe that we should recognize that Europe has a far greater interest in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean than does the United States, and that the European nations have the military capability to defend that interest. Accordingly, we should encourage and welcome European leadership in this area, with particular emphasis on France.

We should be fully willing to cooperate with European leadership, recognizing that our interest would be best served by being a "junior partner" to the Europeans in this area. In particular, we should indicate our willingness to participate in balancing Soviet influence in this area by contributing periodically to a Joint Naval Squadron in the Indian Ocean. Such a squadron could, for example, be based alternately on French, British, and American aircraft carriers. I inquired if the United States has explored the possibility of such a joint squadron; the Department of Defense replied that we have not done so.

Our policy, in summation, should be to recognize and encourage European leadership in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. We should not take it upon ourselves to be the main Western Power in this area, although we should be willing to respond to European initiatives. This would require some change in our basic thinking, which has often resisted European, and particularly French, attempts to provide leadership in Trans-Atlantic affairs. But this is a clear case where Europe has both the most vital interest at stake and the military capability to defend that interest. We do ourselves no service by attempting to take this burden upon our own shoulders, alone.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS McINTYRE, CULVER,
HART OF COLORADO, AND LEAHY

We have heard and reviewed the evidence, but we are not convinced that expansion of base facilities on the island of Diego Garcia is essential to the national interest of the United States at this time. On the contrary, we believe it essential to explore urgently all avenues toward preventing a new superpower arms race in the Indian Ocean.

When the Armed Services Committee last year voted to require Presidential certification of the essential need for these base facilities, the Committee expressed its "hope" that "such an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interest in the area of the Indian Ocean."

Despite that Committee guidance, and despite the widespread interest in preserving the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as urged by the United Nations General Assembly in 1971 and 1973, *no approaches to the Soviet Union on this matter have been made since 1971.*

Diplomacy has not failed; it has not even been tried. No efforts have been made to extend detente to the Indian Ocean.

Instead, we see, by both the Soviet Union and the United States, a continuation of the military momentum for expansion and involvement in that region.

We will examine the alleged military needs for this base subsequently, but what is of greatest concern to us is that the U.S. Government is rushing headlong into a new arms race, in disregard of the opinions of the nations of the Indian Ocean whom we seek as friends, of the declared wish of the U.N. General Assembly, and of this Committee and the Congress.

Before we can consent to this base expansion, we need clear evidence of a compelling need for this facility as well as proof that mutual restraint cannot be achieved. A year of diplomatic inactivity, followed by a two-sentence Presidential certification, is not sufficient.

A major naval arms race in the Indian Ocean is too frightening a prospect to back into blindly, pushed by ever-present military calls for flexibility.

Weak Justifications for Expansion

The case for U.S. base expansion is based on a basketful of assumptions about hypothetical contingencies. For Diego Garcia to be useful and essential, we have to assume: (1) that none of the 18 nations of the Indian Ocean littoral which now allow us port visits will permit such visits in the future; (2) that the Suez Canal is open to Soviet warships and not to American ones—and that prudent Soviet planners would rely on that vulnerable, blockable waterway in the event of conflict; (3) that other nations, such as France, which now maintains a sizable presence in the Indian Ocean, would refuse to cooperate with the United States in assuring freedom of the seas and a continued

flow of petroleum; (4) that the Soviet Union would risk confrontation with the United States in that region, without regard for global consequences; and (5) that this one base, by itself, would be defensible and sufficient to support major military operations in the Indian Ocean area.

Each of these assumptions, by itself, is weak, and the likelihood that all would occur simultaneously is quite remote.

(1) The United States currently has access to 18 nations along the Indian Ocean, while the Soviet Union's ships can call at only 13. According to the Defense Department, U.S. oilers could now obtain fuel from some 36 different Indian Ocean ports. Some of these nations—such as Iran, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia—have long been friendly to the United States, and reportedly share our concern in limiting Soviet influence in the area. Since many of the Persian Gulf nations have also received substantial amounts of U.S. military equipment in recent years, it is highly unlikely that they would renounce these ties and jeopardize access to spare parts.

(2) Although the opening of the Suez Canal reduces transit time for Soviet ships from the Black Sea, it also permits quick access for all but the largest U.S. carriers from the Mediterranean. In the event of hostilities, the Canal might be expected to be blocked, leaving Soviet sea routes longer and more vulnerable than those of the United States.

(3) France still retains several installations in the Indian Ocean as well as a naval presence comparable to that of the Soviet Union. It is reasonable to assume that France would act in its own interest to assure oil supplies, and such action could be aided by cooperation with other NATO allies in the area.

(4) While the Soviet Union clearly has a capability for trouble-making in the Indian Ocean, the risks of escalation must weigh heavily against any direct military confrontation with the United States, whether or not we have a base at Diego Garcia. Moreover, the United States Navy has numerous tactical advantages over the Soviet Navy, which must operate its ships from fewer ports and at greater distances.

(5) In the "worst case" scenario, which has been trotted out to justify Diego Garcia, this one base is somehow vital and sufficient for the support of major military operations in the Indian Ocean. Unless we wish to build other bases and substantially increase our Navy so that it can fight a three-ocean war, the present facilities on Diego Garcia should be sufficient. In any event, these questions should be faced squarely and not piecemeal.

Potential Utility of Diego Garcia

Several crucial questions about the planned use of this base have not yet been answered to our satisfaction.

(1) *What foreign policy commitments do we have in the area?*—We have no formal treaty commitments to any littoral nation west of Thailand except Pakistan, which is still nominally a member of SEATO. We do, of course, seek "stability" in the region, but that policy has been pursued with massive arms sales rather than by new defense commitments. Whatever general interest we have in maintaining freedom of the seas and safe transit for oil supplies can best be served by working in concert with other nations instead of unilateral military adventures. Since there is no obligation to consider deployment of forces into the countries of the region, there is no need to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia. We can and do show the flag now.

(2) *How would Diego Garcia be used?*—We have reached no final agreement with the British on the usage of this base, and there are no assurances that whatever agreement is reached will be submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Thus, we may never be able to judge whether this executive agreement will indeed protect our interests and permit the various possible operations which have been offered as justification for this base. If the British retain a veto right on special operations, we cannot be sure that this base could ever be used in extraordinary circumstances.

(3) *Can Diego Garcia help protect oil supplies?*—Those most likely to interfere with oil supplies are not the Soviets, but the oil-producing nations of the area, which we are arming now through massive foreign military sales. The U.S. Navy can be of little help in ending an embargo unless we are going to contemplate an amphibious invasion—which most U.S. officials have publicly ruled out. Even in that circumstance, with the risk of much wider war, Diego Garcia is probably too vulnerable and too limited to be relied upon. Our Navy still retains a global operating capability and can deploy a “presence” whenever needed.

In short, if our goal is simply to be able to “show the flag,” we have that capability now, without Diego Garcia. And if our goal is actually to be able to conduct major military operations, Diego Garcia by itself is probably not sufficient.

Soviet Activity in the Area

We recognize and regret that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its influence and operating capability in the Indian Ocean area, but we do not believe that Soviet actions thus far, in the absence of serious diplomatic efforts to achieve arms restraint, justify the proposed U.S. base expansion.

Last year the Navy presented a frightening array of possible Soviet bases—on Socotra; at Umm Qasr, Iraq; at Aden; at Berbera; and on Mauritius. CIA Director Colby minimized most of these possibilities. He called Socotra “a bare island . . . no port facilities or fuel storage . . . air strip not feasible for modern operations.” He called Umm Qasr a “so-called port” about which the Iraqis has been restrictive of the USSR. At Mauritius the USSR has only bunkering rights. Aden was called “a good base,” but “the Soviets have not used it very much”—only port visits. “The limited facilities that the Soviets use now,” Mr. Colby testified, “such as those in Berbera or Umm Qasr, would require considerable development—and probably changes in the host countries’ policies—to provide major services.”

This year the list has dwindled. The only evidence of Soviet base expansion in the past year was at Berbera, in Somalia, where the Soviet Union was said to be expanding POL storage, constructing additional housing, lengthening the airstrip, and building a missile storage and handling facility.

It remains to be seen whether these facilities will become and will be used as a major Soviet base. Crucial questions remain on the extent of Somali control over the facilities, who will control and use the port and airfield, and whether Soviet personnel will be permanently stationed there. The very fact that the Somali Foreign Minister has denied U.S. Government claims about this base and has offered to let foreigners visit Berbera suggests that this base may not be as sensitive and important as Defense Department witnesses have alleged. Until

these matters have been investigated further, we remain unconvinced.

The possibility of antiship missile storage facilities is also not a serious cause for concern, since such missile are most useful when deployed with ships or aircraft. In this respect, the U.S. Navy has a wide array of weapons to defeat enemy ships, and will enhance that capability when the Harpoon missiles now being procured become operational. Carrier-launched aircraft can patrol and operate effectively over broad ocean areas to protect U.S. interests, so we do not need land storage facilities for missiles.

Instead of reacting by expanding our own permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, we should use this opportunity to seek firm limitations on what the superpowers will do in that region. Before we build a checkerboard of bases, we should exhaust diplomatic efforts.

Opinions of Littoral Nations

Despite repeated inquiries, none of the 29 nations on the Indian Ocean littoral has given public support for the proposed U.S. base expansion on Diego Garcia. Although some officials are willing to give private assurances of support for the U.S. plans, we believe that, if public criticism is dismissed as rhetoric, secret words of support have even less value.

If we are to build and maintain good relations with the countries of this region, we cannot disregard their opinions, even if we do not always accept their views. For our presence to have any meaning in the long run, we must have the open, willing support for our efforts.

The real answer is not in ephemeral private opinions but in joint cooperation and regional strength. We believe that most if not all of these nations would prefer and would support mutual restraint by the Soviet Union and the United States.

This goal should be pursued urgently instead of being preoccupied with expanding the base at Diego Garcia.

In recent weeks, there has been extensive discussion in Congress and in the public media about the objectives and administration of our foreign and defense policies. There has been a general feeling that the end of the Vietnam involvement should mark the beginning of a new era of initiative and precision in adjusting to new realities in the world.

One central point that was repeatedly made stressed the need for closer linkage between our defense outlays and planning with defined foreign policy objectives.

In this context, the proposed base expansion on Diego Garcia assumes a symbolic importance far beyond its military importance. Here is an opportunity to make an informed, realistic decision on the basis of military facts and foreign policy goals measured on a global scale.

For these reasons, we recommend that the Senate approve S. Res. 160.

JOHN CULVER.
GARY HART.
PATRICK J. LEAHY.
THOMAS J. McINTYRE.



**DISAPPROVE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA**

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

FILE COPY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. Res. 160

**TO DISAPPROVE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE
ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA**

JUNE 10, 1975

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

53-949 O

WASHINGTON : 1975

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, *Chairman*

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri	STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington	JOHN TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada	BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, New Hampshire	WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia	ROBERT TAFT, Jr., Ohio
SAM NUNN, Georgia	DEWEY F. BARTLETT, Oklahoma
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa	
GARY HART, Colorado	
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont	

T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*
JOHN T. TICER, *Chief Clerk*

(II)

LIST OF WITNESSES

	Page
Hon. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense-----	5
Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-----	21
George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State-----	24

(III)

DISAPPROVE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS ON THE ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1114, Everett M. Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Culver, Hart, of Colorado, Leahy, Thurmond, Goldwater, and Bartlett.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; W. Clark McFadden, II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Nancy J. Bearg, John A. Goldsmith, Robert Q. Old, James C. Smith, II, professional staff members; Susan J. Clark, and Roberta J. Killgore, clerical assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.

Members of the committee, this is an open hearing. It may be that we will have to go into closed session later. That will depend upon what facts may develop. Anyone can, of course, make any suggestion they wish, including the witnesses if we get into matters that are classified.

We are glad to have our photographer friends with us, and we will ask them to remember the rule which they more or less helped to adopt.

I have a one-page statement here, very brief, that I dictated myself that I will read.

We open hearings today under the special resolution of disapproval of the funds for Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This is under the special arrangement as to procedure that was worked out last year by the House and Senate conferees on the authorization bill.

I think it goes without saying that we certainly need some presence in the Indian Ocean. I have never been one to be frightened by every movement of the Soviets, but the Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean, seen in the last few years and especially in the last 12 months, has been extensive. They have recently had ships in the Indian Ocean and, of course, they have a right to do that, however, with the opening of the Suez Canal, this will also make a difference.

Further, there is no doubt any longer about the nature of their missile base at Berbera. Without a doubt this is a missile base. And I believe I will leave it to the witnesses to how far they go in disclosing intelligence in this field.

Our proposed installation on Diego Garcia is a relatively small and low profile installation. Our testimony last year, some of which at least

will be brought forward this year, limits the Navy to a very small installation on this tiny island, which is really no more than you might call a filling station, and which in the olden days was called a coaling station.

I was somewhat lukewarm on this matter when it was first proposed several years ago, but in view of the overwhelming facts now that have developed, the evidence is clear and convincing that we need this service station in the Indian Ocean, and that no more time should be lost. Of course, it goes without saying that our country and the rest of the free world have a truly great interest in the oil in the Middle East, and we certainly cannot afford to be cut off from there.

I extend a welcome to the witnesses today. I want to ask Senator Symington if he wants to say something before we start. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if prior to beginning this hearing, everybody felt the way that you do about this issue there really would be no need for a hearing at all.

As you know, we approved funds for this project in the subcommittee on military construction subject to the outcome on the Mansfield "disapproving" resolution.

I have been involved in this for some 7 years or longer. At one time it was presented on the basis of taking installations out of Ethiopia, especially Eritrea, which might be a substitute, and since then it has grown in interest on the part of the Defense Department.

Many countries have opposed it. It is not entirely clear to me whether we or the British have title to the island. And I have been told by the staff that in this ocean the French have as much influence in the way of position as anybody.

I have heard the Prime Minister of Australia say not only did his country oppose it, but that virtually every country on the Indian Ocean opposed development of this naval base.

You talk about a very small installation on this tiny island. A carrier can be based on the island, as plans go, and also it will have a 12,000 foot runway. So regardless of how small it is, it is the creation of a major strategic base in an ocean which at times has been called the one remaining ocean of peace.

I notice that Senator Mansfield has put in the record of June 2 a statement from Kuala Lumpur by Philip Habib that the United States is going ahead with construction of an air and naval reconnaissance facility on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean despite opposition from Congress. Mr. Habib said at a news conference that the United States "has no aggressive intention at all in the Indian Ocean and that the move is to insure the safety of U.S. ships and commitments in the area."

Senator Mansfield said :

I do not know what the commitments are. I do know that Congress has not yet approved the proposal to the President of the United States. I hope here again the words would be muted until the facts are laid out and a decision is reached.

When Mr. Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia was in New York at the U.N., he was asked by Mr. Spivak on Meet the Press :

Mr. Prime Minister, you have been critical of United States plans to strengthen naval facilities in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia. Do you think it is necessary for the United States to do that in order to meet increased naval pressure in that area?

Mr. WHITLAM. As I said, when I was asked at a press conference at the U.N. on this three days ago, there is no nation around the Indian Ocean which welcomes a buildup on this uninhabited British group of islands.

Mr. SPIVAK. Would you like to see the United States withdraw entirely from the Indian Ocean regardless of what the Russians do?

Mr. WHITLAM. No; certainly not. Certainly not. Russia and America are the world's great naval powers. They can sail wherever they choose. That is clear. But we don't want a proliferation of armaments in the Indian Ocean, which up until now has been freest of all of the world's oceans of this American-Soviet confrontation.

I did not know I was going to make a statement, Mr. Chairman, because I did not know that you were going to be a strong advocate for the Diego Garcia buildup prior to testimony. But I would say that one of the reasons that I am taking this position at this time is that I believe a sound economy and a sound dollar are as important to national security as the location of any additional bases in the Far East.

So for these reasons, which under the circumstances, I have just taken off the top of my head, I cannot agree on the important necessity of this proposed additional expansion of U.S. facilities in a part of the world so far from the United States.

And one other point. If it is necessary for us to spend the tens of billions of dollars that we are spending in order to launch missiles anywhere from 4 to 6,000 miles with the Trident, and with the retro-fitted Posiedon, provided we reduce the number of warheads in the Posiedon, then we are not only wanting to eat our cake but to have it too at the same time. Of course, it is just another expense that I do not think is necessary, and I am becoming increasingly worried about the economic, fiscal, and monetary problems of the country.

I am sorry that I cannot agree with Senator Stennis but as long as he asked me to make a statement and let me give my position on it, I want to say in all good humor that this is the way I feel about it, and has been the way that I have felt about it for some years as the chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee and based on the overall situation I find developing in the testimony on the Foreign Relations Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Let me just say this, especially in view of the fact that additional members of our committee have arrived, gentlemen who have shown a very fine interest in the subject matter, and we have been at it diligently since January. The money, the primary money—I will wait until I can have their attention—the primary money for Diego Garcia was in the authorization bill and the appropriations bill last year. But there was a special agreement that this matter would be subject to a resolution of disapproval before the money could be spent. At that time there was some question about the position of the British Government with reference to this island.

This year, the second increment of some \$10 million or \$12 million I believe it is—

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is \$13 million.

The CHAIRMAN. \$13 million, but it is part of last year's justification, and was left out with the understanding that it could be requested this year. It is in this year's authorization bill, and I want to thank the Senator from Missouri for his cooperation in just letting it ride along with whatever happens to this resolution. And that is the au-

thorization bill for military construction that passed the Senate yesterday.

So this is a special proceeding under this special resolution.

Senator Thurmond, you have come in since I opened the meeting. You are the senior member of the minority, and I call on you if you wish to make some remarks now.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I supported this matter previously, I support it now. I do not think there is any question about it that the Soviets are expanding in the Indian Ocean, and especially in the last 12 months, and that it is important for us to proceed with this installation.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless there are some other remarks that you wish to make, gentlemen, we will proceed.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, I feel very strongly about the Indian Ocean. I do not think there is any question in the minds of anyone who studies strategy that the Indian Ocean has become the focal point of global strategy with the opening up of the Suez Canal, with the importance of the Straits of Malacca. He who controls the Indian Ocean is going to control the economy of the world as long as oil is needed to run the economy of the world.

Now that we have lost South Vietnam, and I hate to say this, are about to lose Thailand and the Gulf of Thailand to the enemy, they can do with their massive army what the Japanese could not do with their massive navy; namely, take Indonesia, take all of the countries down through and including the Straits of Malacca, at which time those straits could be denied to any country in the world not friendly to Red China or any of her allies.

And now as to the Indian Ocean itself, too many of us forget the geography of that vast ocean. We have Afghanistan and Pakistan bordering Iran, standing between the southern Soviet border and the northern shores of the Indian Ocean. I do not think it is any secret that Afghanistan and the Soviets have been talking; they may even be in the process now, I am not sure, of building highways or railroads down to try and make an agreement with Pakistan, which at the present time is not any possibility to the end that Asia will have access to the Indian Ocean by rail or by highway or by both.

Mr. Chairman, when we sit here and realize that the closest naval installation that we have to the Indian Ocean is Subic Bay, and it is about 4,000 miles away, and that if the Straits of Malacca are closed to us, we have absolutely no control over our interests in the Indian Ocean.

I have the same apprehension about the economy of this country as my friend from Missouri. And in fact, I think it is just as strong, it might even be greater, and I suggest that the money we spend on defense is not the major cause of the decline of the dollar or of inflation. It is the money that we waste on every other thing that we do in this country. The money we spend on national defense becomes a smaller part of our gross national product and a smaller part of our budget than it has been at any time, and I think it has reached a dangerous level. And I merely bring that in so that we all know where we stand.

I support the effort to open Diego Garcia.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, if there is nothing further, we will ask the Secretary to proceed. Mr. Secretary, I have asked them to put those charts down on the floor so that the gentlemen at the table can see and hear better. But I am glad that you have some charts, which I hope are good ones. Sometimes it looks like they are kind of drawn lefthanded. I am a third grader, I barely got beyond the third grade, you understand.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that if there are any other members of the committee, my good friend, Senator Goldwater has expressed his position, you have yours and I have mine, that they be allowed to express their position also at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think any one has to ask permission, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Somebody raised their hand.

The CHAIRMAN. I had not noticed that Senator Hart's hand was raised, and I thank you for calling that to my attention.

All right, Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement. I would just like to register my continuing frustration at not being able to get these statements according to committee rules a day ahead of time so that we can study them.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I set this hearing as soon as we got through with the authorization bill, and that was Friday at 6 p.m., a little after, as you know. I am sorry that we did not have a statement for you, but I do not think they knew we were going to hold the hearing until I believe I announced it Friday night. We will do better next time. I am glad you brought it up, and I stand behind you on it.

Committee: Addressed to Sen. Goldwater; Do you have something else?

Senator GOLDWATER. No; I would just like to know when the meetings are. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we will get a trumpet, Mr. Clerk, and call Senator Goldwater in and let him know when we are having it over here in this building especially, and all of the rest. I think it would be nice to give a special telephone call, whether there is additional notice or not when we are meeting outside of the regular place.

Senator GOLDWATER. I would like the trumpet.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE**

Secretary SCILESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, if it is the pleasure of the members of the committee, I shall read selectively from the statement so as to consume less time.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee——

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We have your statement here before us?

Secretary SCILESINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary SCILESINGER. I am here today to clarify the purposes for which we seek an augmentation of our facilities at Diego Garcia. This is pursuant to the special legislation in the Military Construction Act

of 1975. In accordance with section 613, the President has certified on grounds of military and foreign policy the necessity of this facility; \$13.8 million is requested for the facility.

At the present time we have a limited communications station on Diego Garcia. The purpose of the new construction would be to expand this station to include certain support functions beyond the present communications role.

The runway would be lengthened to 12,000 feet from 8,000 feet. Aviation fuel storage would be increased from 60,000 barrels to 380,000 barrels, and there would be 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships.

The anchorage would be dredged in the shallow coral lagoon which could accommodate the ships of a carrier task force. The pier would be lengthened to 550 feet of berthing, primarily for the rapid loading or unloading of fuel.

There would be further improvements of the air field, additional quarters for approximately 300 officers and men, and additional storage power and other ancillary facilities.

The military construction funds required for this project would approximate \$37.8 million to be carried out by Seabee units through fiscal year 1979. At the present time, there are approximately 600 Seabees on the island completing previously authorized work on the communications station and harbor, which is expected to be finished during this calendar year. There are about 430 U.S. military personnel currently assigned to operate the communications station and the airstrip. Under the expansion program this number would rise to approximately 600.

Our principal objective in requesting this facility is to provide secure access to logistical support for our forces operating in the Indian Ocean. Our naval forces operating there today must rely either on local sources of fuel or else must be replenished by a chain of tankers stretching over 4,000 miles from U.S. facilities in the Philippines. The additional fuel storage we have proposed would permit a normal carrier task group to operate for about 30 days independent of other sources of supply. That margin of time could spell the difference between the orderly resupply of our forces and a hasty improvisation which could place unwieldy demands on our support assets in other areas. The same is true of the repair and maintenance which could be performed on ships and aircraft.

In short, the proposed facility would provide the assurance of U.S. capability to deploy and maintain forces in an area which has become increasingly important over the past decade.

Mr. Chairman, for nearly two centuries the Indian Ocean was the military preserve of Great Britain, which exercised control over the vital sea lanes to India and the many outposts of the British Empire. From the early 19th century, Britain opposed Czarist attempts to extend Russian rule into South Asia, just as it later cooperated in countering postwar Stalinist efforts in Azerbaijan to extend Soviet influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

In the economic environment of the 1960's the British were forced to reorient their priorities toward Europe and away from Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is an interesting coincidence that 1968—the year the British announced their intention to withdraw—was also the year

when the U.S.S.R. first established what has now become a permanent naval presence in northwest Indian Ocean.

While this transition from British dominance to a more diffuse power structure has been in progress, the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region have been growing. We have become increasingly dependent on the oil which is constantly moving in tankers along the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and our allies are even more dependent. We have an immediate stake in the stability and security of this very large body of water where half of the world's seaborne oil is in transit at any given time.

Consequently, we have been concerned at the steady growth of Soviet military activity in the region. I would like to review briefly the sequence of events by which this increase of Soviet military presence has developed.

The first Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968 were small and tentative in nature. Lacking any shore facilities, the original contingents of Soviet ships were satisfied to remain mostly quiescent, spending most of their time at anchorages in international waters, with only occasional brief port visits to break what must have been a monotonous existence. This cautious probing of unfamiliar waters is very reminiscent of Soviet initial deployments into the Mediterranean some 5 years earlier.

When the Soviet Navy began to deploy to the Mediterranean in 1963, following an abortive earlier attempt to introduce submarines into Albania, there were very few ports open to them and they spent most of their time sitting idly at anchor. But the Soviets grew more confident with time, and when Egypt made port and airfield facilities available to them after 1967, they were quick to increase the scope and intensity of their operations. By the time of the Arab-Israel war of October 1973, they were able to introduce and sustain an armada of more than 90 ships, including the most modern in their inventory.

As early as 1962, the Soviets agreed to assist the Government of Somalia in constructing port facilities in Berbera, a small port overlooking the entrance to the Red Sea. The harbor was completed in 1969, and 1971, 16 Soviet ships paid visits to the port. In 1972, Marshal Grechko visited Somalia for the signing of a Soviet-Somali agreement, and this was soon followed by an increase in Soviet use of facilities at Berbera, including the establishment of a naval communications site and the arrival of a barracks and repair ship which has remained as a permanent feature ever since. In late 1973, the U.S.S.R. began initial construction of what has subsequently been identified as a missile storage and handling facility at Berbera, suggesting that the Soviets had plans for such a facility even before the events of the October 1973 war and the introduction of a more frequent U.S. presence.

In July of last year, the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Somalia, similar to those signed with Egypt, Iraq, and India. Several months later, approximately coincident with a visit by the commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, we noted the beginning of a significant expansion of Soviet facilities at Berbera, including expansion of the POL storage, construction of additional housing ashore, and the beginning of a very long airstrip. The emerging configuration of a missile storage and handling facility became apparent. It is evident that the U.S.S.R. is in the process of establish-

ing a significant new facility capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean.

The U.S.S.R. has also provided assistance to the Government in South Yemen in managing the former British Port of Aden, which was the fourth largest bunkering port in the world when the Suez Canal was in operation. This port lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Berbera and commands the northern side of the entrance to the Red Sea. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is assisting Iraq in the construction of a port, Umm Qasr, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. However, Soviet development and use of these two facilities have been much more modest than at Berbera.

The Soviet Union has become a major sea power only in the last decade. The first display of Soviet global naval power—the so-called OKEAN exercise in 1970—was intended to demonstrate Soviet capability to conduct coordinated naval operations in every ocean of the world. A similar worldwide exercise was held in April of this year. For this event, the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately doubled. Activity was centered in the northern Arabian Sea, at the crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. The exercise was supported by long-range aircraft operating from the Soviet Union, and for the first time, by maritime patrol aircraft operating from airfields in Somalia.

It is worth remembering that the entire Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean, which now averages approximately 19 ships on a regular basis, has occurred during the period since the Suez Canal closed in 1967. We anticipate, that, with the canal once again open as of last week, we will see an increase in the level of Soviet merchant ship traffic and commercial activity with South Asia. We will be watching very carefully for any change in the pattern of their naval deployments. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the opening of the canal reduces the distance from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea from 11,500 miles to only 2,500 miles—a difference in sailing time of 24 days. It also reopens to the U.S.S.R. a warm water transit route from European Russia to the Soviet Far East, which will undoubtedly be important for the transfer of naval units between eastern and western fleets. Whether this will mean an increase in Soviet naval presence on a regular basis is not certain, but it will certainly increase Soviet flexibility in supporting or reinforcing its units in the Indian Ocean.

The level of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean has been prudent. We have had a small permanent presence in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea since 1949, consisting of the command ship, an LSD, and two destroyers of the Middle East force centered in Bahrain. In addition, since October 1973, we have conducted more frequent and more regular deployments to the area from our Pacific Fleet. Over the past 18 months, there have been seven such deployments, including five visits by carrier task groups and two visits by major surface combatants. Over the past year, we have had an augmented presence in the area approximately one-third of the time.

Although we would strongly prefer to see no Soviet buildup of military presence in this region, it appears that the U.S.S.R. intends to undertake such a buildup. Since an effective military balance is essential to the preservation of regional security and stability in this area of

great importance to the economic well-being of the industrialized world, we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence. In a period of historical transition toward a new set of power relationships, only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to insure that the balance is maintained.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my formal remarks. However, since the question has been raised about the ongoing activities at the Port of Berbera, I have here some photos and charts which should illustrate for you the source of our concern.

[The prepared statement follows:]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to clarify for you our reasons for proposing an augmentation of facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. As I have indicated in previous appearances before this Committee and elsewhere, we believe this project is necessary to provide logistical support for our forces which operate periodically in the Indian Ocean.

Since my last appearance here, the President has signed the Military Construction Act of 1975 (Public Law 93-552), which authorized \$18.1 million to begin construction of these facilities, subject to certain qualifications. In response to Congressional request, as specified in Section 613(a)(1) of that Bill, the President certified to the Congress on May 12 that he had evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia and concluded that the construction of such a project is essential to the national interest of the United States. In the absence of any negative action by Congress, it will be possible to commence construction of the support facilities this fall. An additional \$13.8 million in military construction funds has been requested in the fiscal year 1976 Budget.

At the present time we have a limited communications station on Diego Garcia. The purpose of the new construction would be to expand this station to include certain support functions beyond its present communications role. The proposed expansion would include the following:

The runway would be lengthened to 12,000 feet from its present 8,000 feet to permit the operation of larger cargo aircraft as well as high performance tactical aircraft under a variety of circumstances in the tropical climate;

The fuel storage capacity would be increased from the present 60,000 barrels of aviation fuel to a total of 380,000 barrels of aviation fuel and 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships;

An anchorage would be dredged in the shallow coral lagoon which could accommodate the ships of a carrier task group, and a pier would be constructed to provide about 550 feet of berthing primarily for the rapid loading or unloading of fuel;

Various airfield improvements would include additional parking aprons, an arresting gear for emergency use, and limited aircraft maintenance facilities;

Additional quarters for approximately 300 officers and men would be constructed; and

Storage, power, and other ancillary facilities would be expanded proportionate to the intended support functions.

The military construction funds required for this project would be approximately \$37.8 million, to be carried out by Seabee units through fiscal year 1979. At the present time, there are approximately 600 Seabees on the island completing previously authorized work on the communications station and harbor, which is expected to be finished during this calendar year. There are about 430 U.S. military personnel currently assigned to operate the communications station and the airstrip. With the expansion program, this number would rise to approximately 600.

The total cost of the improvements we have requested on Diego Garcia, including the salaries of the construction personnel, their food and fuel, the replacement costs of equipment used in the construction process, the procurement of hardware for the communications station, and all other operating and mainte-

nance costs would be about \$108 million, or roughly the cost of a single navy oiler. In view of the flexibility which the proposed installation on Diego Garcia will offer to our forces, and the operational economies it will make possible, we feel that this is a prudent investment.

Our principal objective in requesting this facility is to provide secure access to logistical support for our forces operating in the Indian Ocean. For example, our naval forces operating there today must rely either on local sources of fuel or else must be replenished by a chain of tankers stretching over 4,000 miles from U.S. facilities in the Philippines. The additional fuel storage we have proposed would permit a normal carrier task group to operate for about 30 days independent of other sources of supply. That margin of time could spell the difference between the orderly resupply of our forces and a hasty improvisation which could place unwieldy demands on our support assets in other areas. The same is true of the repair and maintenance which could be performed on ships and aircraft.

In short, the proposed facility would provide the assurance of U.S. capability to deploy and maintain forces in an area which has become increasingly important over the past decade.

Mr. Chairman, for nearly two centuries the Indian Ocean was the military preserve of Great Britain, which exercised control over the vital sea lanes to India and the many outposts of the British Empire. From the early 19th century, Britain opposed Czarist attempts to extend Russian rule into South Asia, just as it later cooperated in countering postwar Stalinist efforts in Azerbaijan to extend Soviet influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

In the economic environment of the 1960s the British were forced to reorient their priorities toward Europe and away from Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is an interesting coincidence that 1968—the year the British announced their intention to withdraw—was also the year when the USSR first established what has now become a permanent naval presence in the northwest Indian Ocean.

While this transition from British dominance to a more diffuse power structure has been in progress, the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region have been growing. We have become increasingly dependent on the oil which is constantly moving in tankers along the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and our allies are even more dependent. We have an immediate stake in the stability and security of this very large body of water where half of the world's seaborne oil is in transit at any given time.

Consequently, we have been concerned at the steady growth of Soviet military activity in the region. I would like to review briefly the sequence of events by which this increase of Soviet military presence has developed.

The first Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968 were small and tentative in nature. Lacking any shore facilities, the original contingents of Soviet ships were satisfied to remain mostly quiescent, spending most of their time at anchorages in international waters, with only occasional brief port visits to break what must have been a monotonous existence. This cautious probing of unfamiliar waters is very reminiscent of Soviet initial deployments into the Mediterranean some five years earlier.

When the Soviet Navy began to deploy to the Mediterranean in 1963, following an abortive earlier attempt to introduce submarines into Albania, there were very few ports open to them and they spent most of their time sitting idly at anchor. But the Soviets grew more confident with time, and when Egypt made port and airfield facilities available to them after 1967, they were quick to increase the scope and intensity of their operations. By the time of the Arab-Israel War of October 1973, they were able to introduce and sustain an armada of more than ninety ships, including the most modern in their inventory.

As early as 1962, the Soviets agreed to assist the government of Somalia in constructing port facilities in Berbera, a small port overlooking the entrance to the Red Sea. The harbor was completed in 1969, and by 1971 sixteen Soviet ships paid visits to the port. In 1972, Marshal Grechko visited Somalia for the signing of a Soviet-Somali Agreement, and this was soon followed by an increase in Soviet use of facilities at Berbera, including the establishment of a naval communications site and the arrival of a barracks and repair ship which has remained as a permanent feature even since. In late 1973, the U.S.S.R. began initial construction of what has subsequently been identified as a missile storage and handling facility at Berbera, suggesting that the Soviets had plans for such a facility even before the events of the October 1973 war and the introduction of a more frequent U.S. presence.

In July of last year, the U.S.S.R. signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia, similar to those signed with Egypt, Iraq and India. Several months later, approximately coincident with a visit by the Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, we noted the beginning of a significant expansion of Soviet facilities at Berbera, including expansion of the POL storage, construction of additional housing ashore, and the beginning of a very long airstrip. The emerging configuration of a missile storage and handling facility became apparent. It is evident that the U.S.S.R. is in the process of establishing a significant new facility capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean.

The U.S.S.R. has also provided assistance to the Government in South Yemen in managing the former British port of Aden, which was the fourth largest bunkering port in the world when the Suez Canal was in operation. This port lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Berbera and commands the northern side of the entrance to the Red Sea. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is assisting Iraq in the construction of a port, Umm Qash, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. However, Soviet development and use of these two facilities has been much more modest than at Berbera.

The Soviet Union has become a major sea power only in the last decade. The first display of Soviet global naval power—the so-called OKEAN Exercise in 1970—was intended to demonstrate Soviet capability to conduct coordinated naval operations in every ocean of the world. A similar worldwide exercise was held in April of this year. For this event, the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately doubled. Activity was centered in the northern Arabian Sea, at the crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. The exercise was supported by long range aircraft operating from the Soviet Union, and, for the first time, by maritime patrol aircraft operating from airfields in Somalia.

It is worth remembering that the entire Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean which now averages approximately 19 ships on a regular basis, has occurred during the period since the Suez Canal closed in 1967. We anticipate that, with the canal once again open as of last week, we will see an increase in the level of Soviet merchant ship traffic and commercial activity with South Asia. We will be watching very carefully for any change in the pattern of their naval developments. As you know, the opening of the canal reduces the distance from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea from 11,500 miles to only 2,500 miles—a difference in sailing time of 24 days. It also reopens to the USSR a warm water transit route from European Russia to the Soviet Far East, which will undoubtedly be important for the transfer of naval units between eastern and western fleets. Whether this will mean an increase in Soviet naval presence on a regular basis is not certain, but it will certainly increase Soviet flexibility in supporting or reinforcing its units in the Indian Ocean.

The level of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean has been prudent. We have had a small permanent presence in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea since 1949, consisting of the command ship and two destroyers of the Middle East Force centered in Bahrain. In addition, since October 1973, we have conducted more frequent and more regular deployments to the area from our Pacific Fleet. Over the past 18 months, there have been seven such deployments, including five visits by carrier task groups and two visits by major surface combatants. Over the past year, we have had an augmented presence in the area approximately one-third of the time.


Although we would strongly prefer to see no Soviet buildup of military presence in this region, it appears that the U.S.S.R. intends to undertake such a buildup. Since an effective military balance is essential to the preservation of regional security and stability in this area of great importance to the economic well-being of the industrialized world, we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence. In a period of historical transition toward a new set of power relationships, only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to insure that the balance is maintained.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my remarks. However, since the question has been raised about the ongoing activities at the port of Berbera, I have here some photos and charts which should illustrate for you the source of our concern.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary. Of course, you can show those.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, the photos that we have here indicate the activities that are now going on at Berbera. Berbera is located on the Gulf of Aden in the horn of Africa, across from Aden, and helps to control the approaches to the Red Sea. Approximately 85 percent of the Soviet naval activity has taken place in the Gulf of Aden region, from Aden to Berbera, to the Island of Socotra.



From the Persian Gulf around the horn of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope goes all of the oil from the Middle East to Western Europe, and a substantial fraction of our own requirements. In addition, most of the oil going to Japan from the Persian Gulf goes through the Straits of Malacca.

SOVIET MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES BERBERA, SOMALIA

- **PORT FACILITY**
- **HOUSING FACILITIES**
 - BARRACKS**
 - BARRACKS SHIP**
- **COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY**
 - TRANSMITTER**
 - RECEIVER**
- **POL STORAGE EXPANSION**
- **NEW AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION**
- **MISSILE STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITY**


I will briefly indicate to you construction of six types: first, there is construction on the port facility, on housing facilities which include new barracks on land as well as a barracks ship. Then there is the communications facility, including both transmitter and receiver at separate locations; POL storage expansion; the new airfield construction. And finally, construction on the most sophisticated of these facilities, the missile storage and handling capability that is just about operational.

Senator GOLDWATER. Would you tell me, what type of missiles are you talking about?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. These are surface-to-surface missiles, at least for their ships, and probably air-to-surface missiles as well. We do not know the latter, but we presume that it is that intention.

Senator GOLDWATER. SAM's?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. As yet there is no indication of SAM's. Senator Goldwater.



This photograph represents strips from a high altitude reconnaissance mission taken toward the end of April of 1975. The general layout of the Berbera area is indicated, including the port facility which is 1 mile across and 2 miles long. It is reasonably deep water. The draft is 30 to 60 feet, and indicated in there are the six facilities that we shall discuss.


Not indicated at this time is the existing sand airstrip which lies between the POL storage and the high-frequency communications receiver site. That airstrip will be replaced by the new airfield under construction.

Senator GOLDWATER. What is the approximate scale of that photograph? In other words, how wide is each one of those strips?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Approximately 2 miles wide, Senator, each of the strips.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The first facility that has been in operation since 1970 is the Berbera port facility, actually since 1969. There has been a Soviet naval presence since the early 1970's.




The seawall is approximately 1,400 feet long, and there are cranes which you can see in the photograph which permit the rapid unloading of the vessels. At the time this photograph was taken, there were present the barracks ship that had been towed from Vladivostok in 1972, I believe, a submarine repair ship, as well as a freighter which had just unloaded military equipment for the facility. Soviet naval vessels were not present in Berbera at the time because they were participating in the OKEAN exercise, a global naval exercise which doubled the number of Soviet naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean.

There are new facilities which are located ashore. The total storage area at the port is about 165,000 square feet.



We have noted a steady expansion of the housing facilities at Berbera. The original construction consisted of 10 units which would house approximately 500 men. This would be in addition to the 300 that can be housed on the barracks ship. More recently there has been construction of an additional 6 facilities that could house an additional 550 men approximately, and there is room within the fence perimeter for 2 additional such barracks. And even more recently there has been introduction of Soviet housing trailers which can house approximately 200 additional personnel. This is a standard form of Soviet housing. The illustration at the right is taken from open Soviet literature.

All of this area is enclosed in a way that is typical of Soviet security operations. There are guards at the gates in order to protect the Soviet personnel. The capacity, including the barracks ship which is indicated at the port, would permit the Soviets to house approximately 1,500 people in the area.



The long-range communications facilities which are operated at Berbera, and have operated there since 1972, are directed by and large toward the north and to the west—north for communications with Moscow, west and east for communications into Africa and into the Indian Ocean area. These two areas also are fenced, as indicated in the perimeter.

At the receiver site there is a special security area within the compound which has air-conditioning facilities. This is probably an area for coding and decoding, and it is under special security arrangements.



Originally there was a petroleum storage area with a pipeline to the harbor, permitting harbor refueling of ships of approximately 40,000-barrel capacity. This was built by Royal Dutch Shell. More recently, there has been a further expansion of the capacity, amounting to approximately 130,000 barrels of capability which will result in total fuel capacity of approximately 170,000 barrels. The construction you see, once again, is drawn from established Soviet practice in which a large spool of steel is transported. It is 42 feet high, and after its base is established, construction proceeds with the unwinding of that spool of steel. The illustration is taken from open Soviet literature. We have seen similar construction activities in Vietnam and Cuba, and more recently in Syria.

Senator GOLDWATER. What is the base?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It is steel, too, Senator.


Senator GOLDWATER. How long does it take them to construct that tank?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It takes about 3 weeks or something of that sort.


Senator GOLDWATER. How long does it take to build such a tank with our methods?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Excluding the time in getting congressional approval, it would take us approximately 3 months, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's proceed, please.



Secretary SCHLESINGER. This shows a new airfield under construction. The cleared area amounts to 16,000 to 17,000 feet and lies to the north of the city itself. The runway is now under construction. In addition, the cleared runway area is about 1,650 feet across. There is also a taxiway which is apparently under construction. We would estimate that the ultimate airstrip will amount to 13,000 to 15,000 feet.



Here you see construction activities underway at the airstrip. The grading can be seen at the left. The next phase after the grading is the spreading of oil, and then several layers—up to seven layers, depending on the weight of the aircraft—of crushed rock will be put on top of the oiled area. The crushed rock in this case comes from a quarry that has recently been developed approximately 1 mile south of the airfield.



This is perhaps the most interesting and sophisticated facility that we have seen at Berbera. It is the missile handling and storage facility. This facility is a fenced, secured area. Each of the three component areas within the main fenced area is also separately fenced. There is a checkout and an assembly area, a component storage area and a missile handling and fueling area. This facility is similar to those that have been constructed in the Soviet Union. You will note the wide roads, the drive through facilities, the very large aprons, the hard pans that permit the handling of missiles, and a high bay facility which permits the rapid handling of missiles.

Most recently we have noted the presence of missiles at this facility. Until recently we were only aware of the construction activities, which are quite parallel to those which exist in the Soviet Union.

Generally speaking, there has been a substantial increase in the activities in this area. We do not believe that the missile handling and storage facility is in anyway connected with the operation of the Somalis. The capacity for the housing of up to 1,500 Soviet personnel with the secure fencing arrangement, is an indication that the Soviets intend this to be a very substantial facility.

In terms of manpower, in terms of certain types of facilities, it is far larger than the facility intended at Diego Garcia.

Mr. Chairman, I thought that these reconnaissance photos would be of interest to the committee in setting the stage.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you have some now showing us Subic Bay and the distance to the Subic Bay, and so forth.

I will be very brief in my questions and we will move on to the other members. We have General Brown, and General Brown, we are glad to have you. You, of course, are Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you have a prepared statement which we have before us here. If it is agreeable to the committee, I believe that it works well to consider all statements before we have the questioning.

General Brown, do you want to put your statement in the record and summarize it, or would you rather read it?

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCCOMPANIED BY COL. ZANE E. FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN

General Brown. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to submit it for the record and make just three brief points.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, submit that for the record, and it will be admitted in the record at this point. Make your points and then we will start questioning by the committee members.

[The prepared statement follows:]

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to respond to the Committee's request for my comments on the issues raised by S. Res. 160 and President Ford's certification that the construction of the Diego Garcia facility "is essential to the national interests of the United States."

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Any rational analysis of this issue must begin with an appraisal of the strategic importance of the area. The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is derived, not only from its relationship to oil and minerals resources, but also from the air and sea lanes of communication running through it.

Oil from the Persian Gulf area is critical to the industrialized world. Seventy-five percent of Western Europe's oil requirements and eighty-five percent of Japan's must be imported from the Middle East. These requirements cannot be met from any other known source. Thus, these major U.S. allies, and to a significant extent the U.S. as well, will continue to be dependent on Middle East oil for the foreseeable future. The energy needs of the industrialized northern hemisphere dictate a profound concern with access to these resources, particularly those of the Persian Gulf, which has more than sixty percent of the world's proven reserves and with the security of the tanker routes through the Gulf and across the Western Indian Ocean in time of war or political crisis.

While the primary emphasis on the Indian Ocean area has to do with oil, it should be remembered that the Indian Ocean constitutes the principal route for access to other strategic materials and minerals in Africa, including chrome, antimony, asbestos, copper, lead, nickel, and uranium. Access to strategic minerals will be an increasingly serious national concern in the latter part of this decade. The same situation applies to the NATO countries since Africa has been a source of crucial minerals for Europe, especially with respect to the movement of copper. Access to the resources of the region is indispensable to the survival of both NATO and Japan, and we must demonstrate to both allies and would-be adversaries U.S. resolve to deter threats to the vital lines of communication in the area and to prevent closure of these lines of communication if deterrence fails.

The United States also has other important interests in the area even beyond the self-evident needs for access to oil and mineral resources. While the Indian Ocean area is remote from major centers of power, it nonetheless has great potential for unrest which could involve the major powers on short notice.

First, we have friends in the area who look to us for support. We are related to Iran and Pakistan, for example, through the committees of the Central Treaty Organization; and we maintain good relations with the moderate regimes in the Arabian Peninsula and along the east coast of Africa. Second, political stability in a number of countries is likely to be a continuing problem during the mid-range period as a result of the increasing popular expectations of economic advancement and the inability of existing governments to satisfy many of these aspirations, and newly emerging states, so subject to turmoil, look to us to assist them.

A moderate U.S. air and naval presence provides a counter to adventurism from any source. Those who would be our adversaries must not question either our resolve or our capability to ensure that our interests are served. We seek to demonstrate our interests in the area and our concern that it not be dominated by any outside power. As you have recently said, Mr. Chairman, "It is clear that, for the present at least, no nation is too new, too small, too weak, or too remote to challenge the United States if the proper opportunity presents itself."

REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

Should any of these special problems require a military presence, U.S. forces other than the small Middle East Force must come from the Atlantic or Western Pacific. Aside from the obvious considerations of distance and cost, two other factors suggest themselves in determining our support requirements. First, if we are obliged to rely totally on long range capabilities such as B52s, airborne divisions on C-5s, or an amphibious task force embarked from North Carolina or Hawaii, we will lose the ability to contain our reaction by a measured and discreet application of force. We will be confronted with an all or nothing at all circumstance in which the only available reaction may be in excess of that necessary.

Second, the United States was disappointed, but not surprised when some of our allies did not perceive their national interests as being identical to ours with regard to the most recent Middle East War. Without the cooperation of Portugal, which consented to the use of Lajes, the resupply operation which made Israel's survival possible could not have been conducted without great hazard and almost prohibitive cost. A similar restraint could limit our response to a crisis in the Indian Ocean area.

If we are able in the future to respond to a call for help of the nature and magnitude of, say, the Israeli operation, or implement a decision to act in the interests of the U.S., we must continue to develop and invest in secure facilities where we can operate as free of foreign political constraints as possible while still maintaining our alliance system. The best runway, storage facilities, geopolitical location, or deep water port is of little utility if political constraints preclude its use. Thus, the communications facility at Diego Garcia, being owned by the United Kingdom, a country with whom the United States has a historical special relationship, offers us the opportunity to construct a modest installation on an unpopulated speck of land under the sovereignty of a nation whose interests are generally, if not almost universally, identical to our own.

The proposed construction on Diego Garcia would enhance our capability to provide support to U.S. Forces operating in the Indian Ocean. However, there is no intent to permanently station operational forces there of any kind, and the installation would not imply an increase in the level of U.S. Forces deployed in that region. The only permanent personnel will be those required for communications and logistics support. As a refueling and resupply facility, Diego Garcia will provide us with the capability of responding to air or naval requirements in the area either in terms of logistics or surveillance. The modest expanded facility of Diego Garcia will give us an enhanced capability to respond to the requirements of U.S. foreign policy. It will not be an operating base nor will it constitute a significant increase in U.S. military presence.

We have seen how the Soviet Union views the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean to them. While we have been debating the modest expansion of our facility at Diego Garcia, the Soviet Union has nearly completed their development at Berbera in the Republic of Somaliland. Whether or not this installation

is called a "base," is of little importance. It is significant facility. They have pier facilities, a large fuel storage area, a complete missile storage and preparation facility (remarkably similar to those in the USSR), a shore berthing and recreation area, and are now surfacing the airstrip, which is three miles in length. I view this as a clear signal of an increasing Soviet interest in the area; a capability to support such an interest with a military force, if desired or required, and a sign of permanency.

Even after the Diego Garcia expansion, our closest comparable capability to that which the Soviets are building at Berbera will be at Subic Bay. The charter of their naval contingent has hardened into that of a permanently stabilized force with an embarked flag officer commanding a cruiser, two destroyer escorts, two minesweepers, two amphibious ships, a submarine, and six to eight auxiliaries. The Soviets let me emphasize will see to their interests without regard to what we do at Diego Garcia.

Our development of a capability at Diego Garcia to more economically and efficiently support our forces in a contingency does not signify our intent to deploy additional forces. This capability does signify that we have an interest in freedom of the seas and the airways above them, that we have an interest in protecting the vital air and sea lines of communication, and that we have a commitment to ensure that we are able to respond wherever and however our important interests are challenged.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would simply state that the Indian Ocean area is of major importance, that the United States has significant interests in the area, and that the most feasible and economical way to support those interests is the modest program for expansion of the Diego Garcia facility that the President has proposed. I fervently urge your support for that program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General BROWN. The first point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the Indian Ocean is obviously of tremendous strategic importance. Not only are the lines of communication across the sea that carry oil from the Persian Gulf, as the Secretary mentioned, both around Africa and through the Straits of Malacca to Japan important but also the minerals that move from the coast of Africa to the United States. Also to be remembered are the air routes that cross the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia would serve to help with those lines of communication in support of any air or sea movements that the United States might wish to make into the Indian Ocean.

The second point is that we have important interests in the area in addition to the materials that I mentioned. First, we have friends in the area who look to us for some support, principally Iran and Pakistan with whom we participate in the CENTO organization.

And the third point, in summary, is we seek to demonstrate our interest in the area and our concern that it not be dominated by any single outside power. Diego Garcia will be a modest facility, far less in extent than the Secretary has indicated the Soviets have developed and are developing at Berbera.

It was not intended that we would have any military forces deployed or stationed at Diego Garcia. It is intended only that the support facility be manned by those personnel needed to operate the support activity, communications, servicing of aircraft and ships; in total, about 600 personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General BROWN. Those are the points that I wanted to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, I will be quite brief. We also have with us Mr. George S. Vest, who came at the suggestion of the chairman, from the Department of State.

You do not have a statement, as I understand, Mr. Vest?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE S. VEST, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. VEST. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are subject to questioning?

Mr. VEST. Correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for being here and we will proceed now.

Mr. Secretary, last year in preparing this matter for debate on the bill and everything, I wrote a letter or made a request at least to the Chief of Naval Operations and received a reply dated November 26, 1974, from J. L. Holloway III, Admiral, U.S. Navy, setting forth the construction projects and the amount requested. And it says in effect that they have no further plans for any expansion of any consequence beyond the present request for Diego Garcia. What is the situation now, Mr. Secretary, as to any further plans for an expansion of this into a more formidable base?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The plans are unchanged, Mr. Chairman. The improvement costs and the request costs amount to about \$37 million. We intend an austere support facility.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in keeping with the letter, and I ask unanimous consent that the letter which appears on page 16 and 17 of this selected material on Diego Garcia, that was put together at my request so that we would have access to these items rather than looking them up, be included in the record at this point.

[The letter follows:]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
November 26, 1974.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in further expansion of our telephone conversation of noon today.

As you recall, when I discussed Diego Garcia with you in your office in September, I had offered the following points:

The Indian Ocean is an all weather transit route for the Soviet Navy between European and Asiatic Fleets, therefore we can expect the Soviet Navy to be in the Indian Ocean regardless of U.S. Navy presence.

The oil routes from the Persian Gulf to the United States and our allies in Western Europe and Japan run through the Indian Ocean. A periodic U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean will be required, both to protect those supply routes in the event of hostilities, and to demonstrate to our friends in the Middle East, evidence of United States interest and support.

The naval base facility on Diego Garcia will be only a replenishment stop intended to support task groups in the Indian Ocean when the President determines naval forces should be deployed there.

There will be no combat forces permanently based on Diego Garcia.

Without Diego Garcia, U.S. Navy Task Groups in the Indian Ocean will have to be supported from Subic Bay which is over 5,000 miles from the Persian Gulf.

Diego Garcia will not require additional U.S. Navy forces but, in fact, will compensate for programmed reductions in force levels.

The Navy has proposed to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia, originally intended solely to support the Naval Communications Station there. The expanded facilities are for the purpose of providing logistic support to a naval task force. The total cost of these modest improvements to, and expansion of, the currently available facilities, amounts to \$28.6M. We have proposed to fund these projects in two years: \$14.8M in FY 1975 and \$13.8M in FY 1976. The amount for FY 1976 varies from the \$12.1M provided to you earlier because of

cost escalation. A breakout of the principal items in this plan, with the associated costs is included in the enclosure.

In addition, the U.S. Air Force has requested \$8.3M in FY 1975 for projects which would improve the capability of the airfield at Diego Garcia to handle logistics cargo aircraft. The total amounts of Navy and Air Force funds being requested in FY 75 and FY 76 for facilities at Diego Garcia, to improve its capacity for fleet support is \$31.9M.

Incident to the foregoing proposal to fund the fleet support facilities in FY 75 and FY 76, \$6.9M of previously programmed improvements to the communications facilities has been slipped to the FY 77 program.

Other than the \$28.6M in FY 75 and FY 76 proposed for the fleet logistic support function, and \$6.9M programmed for FY 77 for improvements in the original communications facility, the Navy has no plans for future Milcon programs for Diego Garcia.

Sincerely,

J. L. HOLLOWAY III,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Enclosure.

Restructured Diego Garcia development plan

	<i>Thousands</i>
Fiscal year 1975:	
POL storage (320,000 barrels)	\$5,492
Pier	4,000
Runway extension/aircraft parking apron	3,500
Powerplant expansion (phase I)	1,165
Substation	252
Subsistence building addition	898
Subtotal	14,802
Fiscal year 1976 (cost estimates have been escalated from earlier total of \$12.1M to new total of \$13.8M):	
POL storage (160,000 barrels)	1,530
Powerplant expansion (phase II)	1,254
Aircraft parking apron/runway extension	1,173
Hangar	572
Operations building addition	265
Airfield transit storage	160
BEQ—277 men	4,325
BOQ—32 men	1,550
Ready issue ammunition magazine	251
Cold storage	531
General warehouse	713
Receiver building addition	149
Amphibious vehicle repair hardstand	46
Aircraft arresting gear	245
Utilities distribution system	927
Armed Forces radio and television station	109
Subtotal	13,800
Total	28,602

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know now if you have any reason, according to your calculations, to ask for a closed session today?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.


Secretary SCHLESINGER. Unless some question should arise.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, I have permission for this committee to sit today until 12:30. At that time the leader thought that all committee meetings should be terminated at 12:30.

I yield to Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, in your letter of February 16, 1974, to the chairman on Diego Garcia you referred to, and I quote, "growing Soviet naval and air presence and capability in the region." I just am wondering if that presence has increased significantly since that time?



Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. As indicated on this chart, the Soviet presence in the region started in 1968, the year that the British announced withdrawal. It has gradually been growing, one or two ships per year. At the present time there are 17 Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean, 8 combatants and 9 support vessels. The darker red area on the graph since 1972 indicates ship days for mine sweeping operations in Bangladesh and in the Red Sea, so that may be a temporary manifestation. It is generally agreed, however, that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to rise by one or two ships a year, and at the present time is about five times as large as our permanent presence.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what is our primary concern if the Soviet Union is allowed to operate in the Indian Ocean unchallenged?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Our concern is first with the stability of the nations of that area. We would not want them to be overshadowed by the naval presence of the Soviet Union. Second, we are concerned with the very critical dependence of the entire industrialized world on the oil shipments coming out of the Persian Gulf—some 75 percent of Western Europe's requirements comes from the Middle East, and some 85 percent of Japan's requirements. A threat against the se-

curity of these lines of communication could be of catastrophic significance for the United States and its allies. That is our primary concern.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, can a direct relationship be established between our presence on Diego Garcia and our national security other than what you have mentioned?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would believe so, Senator. The necessity is for the United States to maintain the capacity for the logistical base for a naval presence that would maintain the naval balance in the western part of the Indian Ocean should that need rise.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, explain how, if at all, we could use Diego Garcia without these requested expenditures?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have, of course, the present communications facilities that were previously authorized by Congress. But we would not be in a position to use Diego Garcia as a support facility for naval forces of the character indicated unless there is approval by the Congress of the funds that were voted in fiscal year 1975 and are now subject to the measure of disapproval introduced by Senator Mansfield.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what are the alternatives for the United States in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas if Subic Bay in the Philippines was not available and Congress rejects the Diego Garcia request?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have no alternatives that would represent facilities on which we could count other than those that you have mentioned, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. From what you said then, do you feel that if these expenditures are withheld by the Congress that it would jeopardize the national security of the United States?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think such action would be a serious blow to the possibilities of maintaining a naval balance in the western Indian Ocean, which I regard as important to the national security of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. I have a few questions here of General Brown. I do not know how my time is running, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some few minutes left, Senator. Proceed.

Senator THURMOND. General Brown, I thought I would ask a few questions to you here, too. The Soviet Union is expanding its capability to operate in the Indian Ocean with the building of the naval support base at Berbera, Somalia. We had maps there a few moments ago showing that. From an operational point of view, which facility, Berbera or Diego Garcia, will be better suited for Indian Ocean operations?

General Brown. They are both well suited. The Soviet position at Berbera is obviously closer to the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf than Diego Garcia, and it is also in an excellent position to interdict the flow of commerce through the Red Sea and the newly opened Suez Canal.

But more importantly, it seems to me that the character of the two installations differs greatly. The base at Berbera, as we have just seen, will support and sustain naval combat operations, whereas the facilities that we hope to put on Diego Garcia are far removed from that.

They are far less extensive. I would describe Berbera as the initial investment for building a base such as we have at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

Senator THURMOND. General Brown, what is the present position of the Government of Thailand on our use of Utapao airbase to fly P-3 patrol flights to the Indian Ocean?

General BROWN. I think that is probably better passed to Mr. George Vest of the State Department, since it is a political question, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is almost up, be brief.

Senator THURMOND. Would you care to answer that?

Mr. VEST. At this point, Sir, we send supply flights through Utapao to Diego Garcia, and that is the primary function that we carry out through Utapao.

Senator THURMOND. I believe my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, you have had a lot of experience in bombing. It occurs to me that one of the easiest targets, especially with the development of the new missile to interdict, would be the Suez Canal. I have been on it many times, and I presume you have seen it, and you can never be less than considerably surprised at its narrowness. With our Mediterranean position, and the air-to-sea and ground-to-sea missile, if anybody bases the desire for the expansion of this base on the logistics aspect incident with the Soviets if a war came, which heaven forbid, then would it not be relatively an easy target to interdict?

General BROWN. Oh, yes, sir. The canal could be closed without any great difficulty.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is like General Spaatz said in the Korean war, if we could interdict those airfields then they could never have gotten the Migs down, and so I think that argument, to my mind, is pretty theoretical.

When this provision was passed, the President did not certify it for 5 months, Mr. Secretary. Is there any significance in that delay? Was it discussed?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not think that there is any substantive significance in that delay, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you had anybody visit Somaliland?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would have to check. George, do you know of any?

Mr. VEST. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Has anybody seen these things that we have got these pictures of?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir, our ambassador I believe is confined to the area of Mogadiscio.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Somalian Ambassador came to see me and said that these stories of what they were doing were not accurate, and it was my impression that he would be glad to have somebody really look at it. What worries me is that in the beginning when the Defense Department presented their position on the importance of Diego Garcia, and that has been in the last 12 to 18 months, then we requested the CIA to do a review of it, and the CIA review at that time was almost directly opposite to the Defense Department's review. Later

on the CIA was massaged, and they have changed their position. But I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the original position of the Central Intelligence Agency on Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean be inserted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is taken from last year's hearings?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; all right, as taken from last year's hearings, without objection, it will be approved.

[The information follows:]

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FISCAL YEAR 1975

THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (chairman).

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Dominick, and Taft.

Also present: Gordon A. Nease, professional staff member; Joyce T. Campbell, clerical assistant; and Kathy Smith, assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Colby, we welcome you.

I see you have a statement. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF W. E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN B. CHOMEAU, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC RESEARCH; WILLIAM B. NEWTON, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in March 1968, when four ships from Vladivostok made a "good will" visit to most of the littoral countries. In the little over 6 years since those visits, the Russians have maintained a nearly continuous presence in the Indian Ocean area.

The Soviet naval presence has grown slowly but steadily during these years, and has helped Moscow increase its influence in that part of the world.

The forces the Soviets have deployed in the Indian Ocean, however, have been relatively small and inactive.

The vessels have spent 80 percent of their time at anchor or in port visits, mostly in the northwestern portion of the ocean.

Although the number of countries visited annually has decreased since 1969, the general expansion of the naval force and the increased use of ports on a routine basis have resulted in an overall increase in the number of port calls. Put in terms of naval ship days in the Indian Ocean the Soviet presence increased from about 1,000 in 1968 to 5,000 in 1973, excluding harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh.

By mid-1973, the typical Soviet Indian Ocean force included five surface warships—one gun-armed cruiser or missile-equipped ship, two destroyers or destroyer escorts, a minesweeper, and an amphibious ship. There was also usually a diesel submarine, and six auxiliary support ships, one of which was a merchant tanker.

Mr. Chairman, today there are 6 surface combatants, 1 submarine, 9 minesweepers, and 11 support ships in the Indian Ocean, not substantially different from that typical showing, except for the increase in minesweepers, as I will explain later.

Recently, a Soviet intelligence collection ship has been deployed to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the Indian-Pakistan war, and is apparently monitoring developments in the Persian Gulf area.

It will probably also conduct surveillance of any major Western naval movements in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, a group of Soviet minesweepers has recently arrived from the Pacific to conduct mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez—in the areas shown on this map at the bottom. The ones at the top you will note are being cleared by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Last weekend the helicopter carrier *Leningrad*, on a voyage from the Black Sea, rounded the Cape of Good Hope and may join this group. This is by far the farthest from home waters that either the *Leningrad*, or its sister ship the *Moskva*, has ever ventured.

The Soviet warships and submarines sent to the Indian Ocean normally come from the Pacific Fleet, which is also the primary source for logistic support. Combatants from the Western Fleets, however, have operated in the Indian Ocean, but only while transferring to the Pacific.

The Indian Ocean has become, in effect, a "southern sea route" for the inter-fleet transfer of naval units.

About one-fourth of the Soviet warships and submarines that have operated there have been units transferring to the Pacific from the Western Fleets.

The Pacific Fleet naval forces are now being modernized. As part of this effort, since early 1974 the Soviet force in the Indian Ocean has included more modern antiaircraft and antisubmarine units, transferring from Soviet Western Fleets. These units have provided the Russians a more impressive naval presence than could have been drawn from their Pacific Fleet a year ago.

In addition to this de facto improvement in the quality of the Indian Ocean force, the length of time on station for the individual warships seems to be increasing. Some of the ships that have just left the area, for instance were there for a year, as compared to 5 to 16 months for previous rotational tours. This added time on station is at least partly owing to improved Soviet support facilities in the area.

Until 1973, the Russians relied almost exclusively on "floating bases"—collections of auxiliary ships usually anchored in international waters—to provide support to their Indian Ocean naval forces.

The most frequently used anchorages were near the Island of Socotra, and in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,000 nautical miles south of India, where the Soviets have implanted mooring buoys. You will note that Diego Garcia is in the Chagos Archipelago.

Contrary to numerous reports about Socotra, the barren island has no port facilities or fuel storage and its airstrip is a small World War II gravel runway. The only military installation on the island is a small South Yemenese (PDRY) Garrison. A major construction effort would have to precede any significant Soviet use of Socotra, other than as an anchorage.

In early 1973, the Soviets acquired use of some facilities at the small Port of Berbera, in Somalia. These have now been expanded, and the Soviets are now using the harbor for routine ship maintenance and crew rest.

There are no repair facilities ashore, but tenders now provide the same services in port as they previously did at anchor.

The Soviets have set up a naval communications facility near Berbera, and also appear to be building an airfield although they have made little progress. [Deleted.]

The Soviets have use of a POL storage area there, and have constructed a barracks area for their technicians.

Soviet naval ships also have some access to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, in the Persian Gulf, where Soviet technicians have been assisting in minor port development.

Repair facilities at the former British Naval Base at Aden have not been used by Soviet warships, although support ships and, occasionally, small warships stop there for refueling and replenishment. Soviet transports periodically land at an ex-RAF airbase—now Aden's International Airport.

Soviet naval auxiliaries regularly call at Singapore as they enter and exit the Indian Ocean. In addition to receiving bunkers, since May 1972, the Soviet support ships have been serviced in the commercial drydock facilities there.

Moscow's prospects for naval facilities in other littoral countries are not very bright.

The Soviets helped build India's naval base at Vizakhapatnam, and have equipped the Indian Navy with minor warships and diesel submarines.

Nevertheless, New Delhi has not granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. [Deleted.]

The U.S.S.R. is trying in some other countries, too, although prospects are equally dim beyond receiving bunkers. Moscow has apparently made overtures

to Sri Lanka for access to the Port of Colombo, and has sent in research ships, support ships, and an occasional warship—probably trying to accustom the Ceylonese to a Soviet naval presence.

Similar calls have been made to Port Louis, in Mauritius.

The Soviets may also hope to use the facilities in Chittagong, now that they have finished the harbor clearing operation there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Chittagong?

Mr. COLBY. Chittagong is in Bangladesh.

You will recall that the Soviets were asked to help in some salvage and mine-sweeping efforts there. They finished the salvage very rapidly, but the mine-sweeping operation was very complicated and difficult. They just finished that a few weeks ago. They have withdrawn from there now.

We have no evidence that the Soviets have made overtures for naval access to Littoral countries other than Somalia, Iraq, Aden, India, Singapore, Mauritius, and possibly Sri Lanka.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Sri Lanka again?

Mr. COLBY. To people of our age, it was Ceylon.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had an open hearing this morning and a closed hearing this afternoon, but so far it does not seem to me that there is anything that you have said here that should be classified up to IV in your statement. All that information, as I see it, is something that everybody would know that wanted to know it.

Mr. COLBY. There may be a few phrases in there, Mr. Chairman, that would reveal how we learned certain items. But in essence, I agree with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you please declassify, as much as possible of your statement.

Mr. COLBY. I would be delighted to go through this and pull out those few things that have to remain classified and declassify the remainder, Mr. Chairman.

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have been talking about the more or less continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Another aspect of the problem has been the Soviet surge deployments to the area—and these have been highly responsive to U.S. naval activities.

Moscow apparently prefers to keep a minimal force in the ocean that can be quickly strengthened. This provides a "signaling" capability during crisis periods, while avoiding the political and economic costs of maintaining a larger continuous presence.

There have been two occasions when the Soviets have clearly made use of this "signaling" device.

Following the Indo-Pakistani war of November 1971, and almost 3 weeks after the deployment of the USS *Enterprise*, they brought their force level up to six surface combatants, six submarines and nine auxiliaries. This represents a doubling of surface combatants, and a significant increase in submarines, from one to six.

In the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the Soviets responded to the unanticipated deployment of a U.S. carrier task group to the Indian Ocean by sending additional units into the area—increasing their submarine force from one to four. [Deleted.]

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Colby yield at that point?

When you are talking about the Soviets, are you talking about missile firing submarines or attack submarines?

Mr. COLBY. We are talking about attack submarines, Senator.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you.

Mr. COLBY. The timing of Soviet ship movements into the area, both during the India-Pakistan war and following the Arab-Israeli conflict, is instructive. The Russian units left port only after U.S. or U.K. carrier task groups had departed for, or arrived in, the Indian Ocean. All indications were that Moscow was chiefly responding to deployments by the United States and other Western countries, specifically Britain, rather than initiating a unilateral buildup.

There remains one important consideration concerning Soviet naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean—the forthcoming opening of the Suez Canal. We believe this will increase the overall flexibility of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, but not in itself cause a significant increase in the Soviet presence.

Use of the canal would give the U.S.S.R. easier and more timely naval access, particularly in times of crisis, to the western Indian Ocean—that is, the important Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea area.

It also would facilitate the logistic support of ships in the Indian Ocean and reduce Soviet dependence on littoral countries.

A reopened canal would expedite interfleet transfers and deliveries of military aid.

A few warships from the Mediterranean Squadron probably would be sent to the Indian Ocean once the canal opens.

But because of the higher priority of Soviet naval operations in the Mediterranean, and the maintenance of a strategic reserve in the Black Sea, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would still be the chief source for surface combatants—and all of the submarines—for the Indian Ocean. Support ships could be drawn from the Black Sea and the Pacific on a nearly equal basis.

The Soviet Union is likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether or not the Suez Canal is reopened.

Moreover, the U.S.S.R. probably recognizes that the canal is subject to closure in a crisis. The Soviets would not wish to be caught with a substantial portion of available units on the wrong end of a blocked canal, and in considering this contingency they almost certainly would give priority to their Mediterranean squadron.

If there is no substantial increase in U.S. naval forces in the area, we believe the Soviet increase will be gradual, say one to two surface combatants per year.

Mr. COLBY. [Deleted.]

Should the U.S. make a substantial increase in its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet buildup faster and larger than I have just described would be likely. If the canal were open and available to Russian ships, the task of responding would be easier.

In any event, the Soviets would probably not be able to sustain an Indian Ocean force significantly larger than that presently deployed there without reordering their priorities and shifting naval forces from other areas.

Let me now put the Soviet naval activity I have been discussing into the context of overall Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean area.

Viewed from a global perspective, the Indian Ocean area—as distinct from the Middle East—has a lower priority than the U.S., China, or Europe in the USSR's diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow's probable long range strategic objectives in this area are to win influence at the expense of the west, and to limit the future role of China.

Toward these goals, the Soviets use their naval presence as one element in a combined approach that utilizes political, economic, subversive, and military aid activity.

We believe that the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area.

The principal objective of the naval force is to maintain an adequate military strength to counter—or at least provide a political counterweight to—moves made by western naval forces there, particularly those of the United States.

The Soviet leaders have shown that they will maintain a naval presence in the ocean at least equal to, if not greater than, that of the U.S. Navy.

Soviet writings have reflected concern over the possibility of the United States sending nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, but so far the activities of Soviet naval units there have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission.

The Soviets recognize the importance to the west of Persian Gulf oil, and the sea lanes between the Gulf and Europe or Japan. Moscow also perceives a causal relationship between the oil question and recent increases in the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, the normal composition of the Soviet force there—particularly the lack of a significant submarine capability—suggests that interdiction of western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.

At present, about 50 percent of the industrialized countries' oil imports come from the Persian Gulf. This share may decline somewhat in coming years, as alternative sources are developed.


Judging from the size and composition of the Soviet Indian Ocean force, direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.

As for future Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, we believe that growth will be steady over the long term, if there is no permanent increase in U.S. naval forces in the area.

Moscow would probably consider such a measured approach as consistent with a generally growing—and accepted—Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean countries.

Soviet capabilities to project and support larger naval forces in the Indian Ocean are constrained by a variety of factors.

Comparative Steaming Times For Soviet Black Sea and Pacific Ocean Fleets With a Reopened Suez Canal*



First, is the distance and steaming time from the various Soviet fleets. Those in the western USSR now have to go around Africa, and are twice as far from the Arabian Sea as is the Pacific Fleet. If the Suez Canal were open, the steaming time for the fleets in the western USSR would be significantly reduced, as shown on this map. You can see that the red line south of India, Mr. Chairman, shows the point from which you have approximately an equal steaming time from either the Black Sea or the Pacific Ocean fleets.

Other restraints include the requirement to maintain a strategic reserve in home fleet areas, a large deployed force in the Mediterranean, plus the economic and political costs of operating a sizeable naval force in the Indian Ocean.

and political costs of operating a sizeable naval force in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Soviets are not likely to acquire substantially better naval support facilities for their ships in the Indian Ocean area, at least in the near future. There seems to be little prospect for routine access to large shore facilities—such as those in Singapore, India, Sri Lanka, or Aden—for major repair and overhaul of warships.

The limited facilities that the Soviets use now, such as those in Berbera or Unum Qasr, would require considerable development—and probably changes in the host countries' policies—to provide major services.

On the other hand, the Soviets probably hope to increase their capabilities for air reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean. Their prospects are best in Somalia, where Russian technicians are helping to construct airfields at Berbera and near Mogadisio.

Somalia is unlikely to give Moscow permanent basing rights, but would probably allow occasional flights.

TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft staging from Somalia could conduct surveillance from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Strait.

Visits by TU-95's most likely would be on a periodic basis, as in Cuba and Guinea, but might increase in frequency during times of crisis, major western deployments or exercises, or Soviet naval space support activity.

Antisubmarine warfare aircraft, such as the IL-38 May, operating from Somalia could provide surface reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare coverage of the Arabian Sea. These aircraft, as well as TU-16 medium bombers, were based in Egypt until July 1972, and closely monitored U.S. and NATO ships and exercises in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would be very happy to answer any additional questions you might like to ask.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Colby.

The first request would be that you declassify as much of this as possible.

Mr. COLBY. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be your decision.

Mr. COLBY. The other matters I will do it as best as I can.

Senator SYMINGTON. The more information you get out in order to help us make the right decision, the better.

Mr. COLBY. I understand, Mr. Chairman. In our country our decisionmaking has to be public as opposed to some countries where it is to be secret, and consequently, we have to make as much of our input public as possible.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider the Indian Ocean area to be of strategic importance to either the Soviets or the United States?

Mr. COLBY. I would rather answer from the Soviet side, Mr. Chairman. I think the Soviets are interested in the Indian Ocean as an area of expanding their influence, primarily through their political relationships with some of the countries in the area, with the Indians, especially, and some of the other countries in that general area. I think they would obviously be concerned if there were some major threat to Soviet security posed from the Indian Ocean. I think there is a certain interest in posing a possible counterthreat to American or western pressure on the Soviet Union by posing a threat to the oil sources of Western Europe. But it is certainly not in priority anything like their relationships with the United States, Western Europe or China.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Navy spokesmen have indicated that the Soviets have use of facilities in several locations in the littoral area. I would like to take them one by one and have your comments. I have already heard them in another committee, but I would like to hear them now.

The Island of Socotra.

Mr. COLBY. The Island of Socotra, Mr. Chairman, is a bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yemen. The Soviets have used Socotra as they have used many other areas around the world as an anchoring place for their ships. The Soviets spend a considerable portion of their time at anchor. They do their provisioning frequently at anchor. They have anchored there off Socotra in protected waters in order to conduct this kind of reprovisioning and just plain sitting.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about an air strip?

Mr. COLBY. The only air strip on Socotra is an old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modern operations.

Senator SYMINGTON. We were told of anchorages and permanent mooring in the Chagos Archipelago.

Mr. COLBY. There are anchorages in that Archipelago. Again, some of this water between the different islands is international water, and Soviet ships are inclined to anchor there. They have set up some mooring buoys there in international waters so that they can just come on and hook onto them.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is very close to Diego Garcia.

Mr. COLBY. It is not far from there.

Senator SYMINGTON. On Berbera, Somalia, communications station, barracks, repair ships and other facilities, including air strips. What are the facts on that?

Mr. COLBY. Let me give you an overall picture of the port at Berbera, Mr. Chairman. It is a small installation which will handle two or three ships. And there is an air strip under construction outside of Berbera.

They have been building an air strip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mogadiscio.

Mr. COLBY. Mogadiscio is the Capital of Somalia, Mr. Chairman. It is a big town there. They have an embassy, and they have people there, advisers.

The port is a fairly big port. But the area within the breakwater is somewhat shallow water, and you would have to anchor a little offshore and bring lighters in if you use the port at all.

There is an airfield about 30 or 40 miles north-west of Mogadiscio which they have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Iraqi Port of Umm Qasr.

Mr. COLBY. Qasr, you will notice there up at the head of the Persian Gulf.

The sea is down here. You come up a river, kind of a delta area. This particular island is claimed by the Kuwaitis as well as the Iraqis. The facility here, the so-called port, is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the Gulf. The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Soviets free use of this particular port. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. The former British base at Aden and the former Royal Air Force Base.

Mr. COLBY. The former British base at Aden is a good base. It is a good harbor. There are facilities in it. There is an airfield in that town. That is the Capital of South Yemen. And there is an airfield that is an effective airfield and could be used.

The Soviets have not used it very much. They have not done much more than port visits there. But the Government of South Yemen, of course is a Communist government. The Soviets have been assisting them. [Deleted.] So they have a pretty active presence there. But they have not actually used the port facility to that degree.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of a runway do they have?

Mr. CHOMEAU. It is short. It is not large enough to handle the extremely large aircraft, I have forgotten the length.

Mr. COLBY. It is a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16's and larger aircraft.

Senator DOMINICK. It is big enough, Mr. Chairman, to handle the B-24, because I have landed one there.

Mr. COLBY. You know, then.

Senator DOMINICK. It is a horrible place.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably pretty hot, is it not?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore.

Mr. COLBY. Singapore, of course, is a very well equipped port. And the Soviets have bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by. They have also used Singapore for some repair, because there are some good shipyards in Singapore, and some of their auxiliary ships, for instance, have been repaired in Singapore.

Port Mauritius—Port Louis on the Island of Mauritius is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. It is an independent country now, Mauritius. They have sold bunkering to the Soviets.

There are lots of other areas. You can stop by and buy fuel oil if you want to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have they a representative in the United Nations?

Mr. COLBY. I would assume so. I am pretty sure they are U.N. members. Whether they actually keep a mission there or not, I am not sure. But I know we have an ambassador there. As a matter of fact, Phil Manhardt is just going there as Ambassador. As you will recall, he was a Foreign Service officer, and was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for 5 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. I think I have only got one question, and that is what is Mr. Colby's assessment—if we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we by so doing increase the force of the Russian fleet?

Mr. COLBY. I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, would you consider that enlarging the port and the airfield as planned would be such an increase or not?

Mr. COLBY. I am not all that familiar with the details of the plan, Senator Taft. I do think that the public impression of what we do would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to establish a permanent establishment capable of supporting a regular force in that area, that they would react in some fashion in order to establish a countervailing force. That is more or less at any degree at which we do it.

Senator TAFT. If we have a big debate and authorize it, is that going to have—

Mr. COLBY. It will certainly attract their attention.

Senator TAFT. If we go ahead and authorize it, and public opinion seems to justify authorizing it, would that have an effect on being able to negotiate limitations on forces in the area?

Mr. COLBY. I think that our assessment, Senator, is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets will increase that gradually to match any substantial additional American involvement. So that it would really depend upon the size of the investment and the forces that we arrange to be there. If we put in a permanent establishment of some size, why they would correspondingly increase to some substantial degree. If we had only sort of tentative connections there and some improvements, they might just continue their gradual increase.

Senator TAFT. You have not mentioned the British or French forces, I do not think, they are in the area. Both of them have permanent naval forces.

Mr. COLBY. Yes. The French have a naval base up at the north end of Madagascar as well as a base at Djibouti. They keep a permanent force of five to six ships. And the British, their only permanent establishment is in Singapore, where they keep a very small fleet. [Deleted.]

Senator TAFT. That is all I have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator.

Have the number of ports visited by the Soviets in the littoral area increased in the last few years?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The number of ports calls in 1973 has gone up particularly because the calls in Somalia have expanded quite a lot. You will notice that they are rather targeted, there are only certain ones.

Senator SYMINGTON. The number of countries visited have dropped?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. It has been more of a focus where they have visited.

Senator SYMINGTON. [Deleted.] As I understand it, you expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia, is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. COLBY. I think that is true; yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, our estimate of the gradual growth is a reflection of our estimate of the general Soviet intention to assert itself as a major power, as one of the two superpowers, and to assert itself in a world role, and that consequently, there will be a tendency to gradually expand its presence throughout the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who reacted first in the Indian Ocean at the time of the Indian-Pakistan war?

Mr. COLBY. In the Indian-Pakistan war, Mr. Chairman, the first thing that happened was that the British sent a carrier task group to help with the possible evacuation of their citizens. The Soviets sent a force very shortly thereafter. And the American force was sent 2 or 3 weeks later, or something like that.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about in the recent Middle East war?

Mr. COLBY. In the Middle East war the movement of American carrier task group was followed by a Soviet increase in presence, particularly in submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who has access to the most ports in the littoral area, the United States or the Soviets?

Would that be up for grabs?

Mr. COLBY. Even would not be far off, I would say.

Mr. CHOMEAU. I do not know what the United States really has.

Mr. COLBY. The United States, I think, would have access to Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record:

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. There was some question as to whether nuclear submarines could go through the Suez Canal when it is opened. What is the opinion of the CIA on that?

Mr. COLBY. Physically, they could go through it, there is no question about it, after it is opened, physically you can send them through. Whether the Soviets would send them through is something else.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there enough depth?

Mr. COLBY. You mean without being seen? I mean on the surface, obviously, just going through, I do not think there would be much problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. There would not be?

Mr. CHOMEAU. They have enough depth, but it is risky. You have to be certain that you are not going to run into some place where it is silted. But there is enough depth if it is cleared, yes.

Mr. COLBY. It depends upon the permission of the Egyptians, of course.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do either of you gentlemen have any further questions?

Senator DOMINICK. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator TAFT. No questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, July 12, 1974.]

Senator SYMINGTON. The French own more islands than anybody in the Indian Ocean, do they not?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. They have facilities in the Indian Ocean. Whether or not they own more islands than the British, I would have to check the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Both the British and the French have islands?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is my understanding. Are they doing anything to protect their position?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. They are building a naval base?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. They have a naval facility in Djibouti. They refuel, and they have had a rework facility, I believe, in Madagascar. They maintain the second largest fleet in the Indian Ocean after the Soviets, about nine combatant vessels.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned 19 vessels being more than we had. What kind of Soviet ships are those 19?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I mentioned that there were eight combatants and nine support vessels.

Senator SYMINGTON. What kind of combatants?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. There are several destroyers, several submarines, a cruiser, that kind of thing. We can fill that in.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have the submarines in there, and you feel you know all of the submarines that are there? Well, I don't want to use my time. If you would supply that for the record?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate it.

[The information follows:]

A typical Soviet Indian Ocean contingent consists of:

One Guided-Missile Destroyer;

Two Destroyer Escorts;

One Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine;

One Intelligence Collector;

Two Minesweepers; and
One Tank Landing Ship.

Support Ships Include:

Two or three Naval/Merchant Oilers, a Barracks Ship, a Stores Ship, and
occasionally a Space Support Ship.

The average total is around 19 ships in the Indian Ocean contingent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Mansfield quotes the late Senator Russell as saying, and I quote, "If we make it easy for the Navy to go places and do things, we will find ourselves always going places and doing things." If this expansion of Diego Garcia is approved, would it not automatically satisfy a desire to go places and do things?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I appreciate the question, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a quote from the leader and former chairman of this committee.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. In the earlier phase, I was inclined to question the need to extend our facilities into the Indian Ocean. There have been dramatic developments that have occurred in recent years which I think have transformed the character of the problem, and so my position today is one of strong support. If there were not important national interests in the area, whether or not the Navy were inclined to go places and do things, they would not be permitted to do so. But we have important national interests in the Indian Ocean.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is a story in this morning's paper that we are selling three submarines to Iran.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And it is on the Persian Gulf, and our friend, correct?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you file for the record the amount of money that has actually been spent on Diego Garcia up to this time, and under sound accounting principles?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The sum of \$69,997,000 has been spent on the construction of facilities at Diego Garcia to date. This amount includes military construction funds, the pay of military personnel, and related operations, maintenance, and equipment costs.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Vest, one of the arguments against any expansion of Diego Garcia is that the littoral nations do not want us there. Certainly that was a position taken by the Prime Minister of Australia at the U.N. and here in an interview on "Meet the Press". Do you agree with his statement that no country on the Indian Ocean wants us there, and if you do not agree, why not?

Mr. VEST. I do not agree entirely, sir. In general—

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean not entirely?

Mr. VEST. Because I would say he has made an absolute statement; I do not think it works out exactly that way. There are countries in which there are public statements which have taken a more balanced attitude. There are those as well which for their own reasons have seen fit to express the view privately to us that they wish us to be there and maintain a balance with the Soviet forces, but they do not wish for their own reasons to make those points public. That is the actual balance of the situation in the area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, did you say 120,000 barrels of oil at Berbera?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The expansion is between 120,000 and 130,000 barrels added to the existing 40,000 barrels, and the total would be about 175,000 barrels.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many barrels do we plan at Diego Garcia?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We plan an expansion of 640,000 barrels.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think those figures speak for themselves.

Will B-52's be able to, can the runway that you built take B-52 bombers loaded?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No; it would not take a B-52. It would have to be strengthened considerably.

Senator SYMINGTON. There was previous testimony in 1971 that the Soviet Union made overtures to the United States inviting negotiations to prevent an Indian Ocean arms race. Last year this committee in its report on the military construction bill, in discussing Diego Garcia, said:

Because of the importance and complexity of issues raised by Diego Garcia, the committee felt it was important for the new administration to make a full reevaluation of this matter. It is the hope of the committee that such an evaluation would include a thorough explanation of the possibility of achieving with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint without jeopardizing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area.

Has anything been done to initiate with the Soviets a discourse on the possibility of mutual arms restraint?

Mr. VEST. Senator, as you know, in 1971 we had negotiations with the Soviets within which we pursued it after their first mention of the matter, and got no followup from them whatsoever. There has not been a specific overture to the Soviets in the intervening time. We have said repeatedly that we are willing to consider any constructive position or suggestion, and nothing has come forward that we have considered as falling into that category.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the answer to my question would be "no," is that correct?

Mr. VEST. Correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Assuming that talks are initiated with the Soviet Union on mutual arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, would not our negotiating position be strengthened if the expansion of Diego Garcia did not proceed?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator—

Senator SYMINGTON. I think Mr. Vest might answer that, if I may.

Mr. VEST. I would say no, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not think so?

Mr. VEST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. Thank you very much. Senator Goldwater, that brings us to you.

Senator GOLDWATER. Yes; just a point or two to begin with. At one time before the downfall of Portugal we had access to I believe 16 ports around the perimeter of Africa. That may be one or two off here or there. Today we have to assume those ports are no longer available to us. Now, the Suez Canal to me is not really a contributing major factor to the importance of the Indian Ocean to our strategy in this world. But yesterday the Phillipines signed an agreement with Red China. They pulled themselves out of Taiwan.

I am interested in an answer to this question. Could not the Red Chinese, using their new relationship with the Phillipines, use this obvious influence to force the Phillipines to get us out of Subic Bay?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is a possibility, Senator Goldwater. We certainly hope it does not materialize that way.

Senator GOLDWATER. I know we hope that, but it is a possibility that you have to use in the long range planning.

Now, General Brown, you have answered the question about B-52's. What is your assessment of the increased capability of the Soviets to operate from Berbera now that the Suez Canal is reopened? I am particularly interested in the astounding statement or picture that the runways are 14,000 to 17,000 feet at sea level, and the longest runway we have in the United States is about 13,500 feet at about 75 feet above sea level. What are they going to use this for?

General BROWN. I do not know, Senator. I share your interest in it. It seems excessive even with the temperature conditions they get at sea level. But even for very heavy loaded, long-range patrol, naval aircraft, I would not think that they would need the total runway length.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. May I say, Senator, to clear a 100-foot obstacle for the Soviet Bear requires 13,000 feet at 105 degree temperatures, which is not infrequent at Berbera. The temperatures tend to drive the airstrip requirements.

Senator GOLDWATER. I realize that, but I doubt that there is a 50-foot obstacle within 500 miles of the runway.

General Brown, relative to Diego Garcia, the planned increase in the ramp area, will that be capable of accommodating the C-5A and a 747?

General BROWN. Yes, Senator, but in relatively small numbers. There is to be only 110,000 square yards of parking area.

Senator GOLDWATER. If the runway will not sustain the weight of the B-52, how do you propose to have it sustain the weight of a loaded C-5 or a 747?

General BROWN. Well, as you remember, the C-5 is built for off-runway operations. We spread its weight around an awful lot of landing area. It is really very lightly footed in relation to the runway. I have forgotten the exact weight per square inch of tire pressure, but it is very low, much less than the C-141.

The restrictive feature on sustained B-52 operation there is, obviously, that the runway is too weak, and for all but emergency operations it is too narrow. It only will exceed the outriggers on the B-52 by a little over 1 foot, 7 inches. It would be a pretty risky operation to take a B-52 in.

Senator GOLDWATER. A little close.

Why is it advantageous for the Navy to be able to operate land-based long-range antisubmarine warfare and patrol aircraft from Diego Garcia?

General BROWN. To sustain their surveillance operations throughout the oceans of the world where we have major shipping activities.

Senator GOLDWATER. Would this not become increasingly important if threats to the Straits of Malacca grew?

General Brown. No question about that; yes, sir.

Senator GOLDWATER. I want to point out the Straits of Malacca are very, very narrow. Getting one of our large carriers through there is really an act of seamanship. It looks like a wide strait but it is very narrow in the center point and very shallow, and so we are talking about something almost like the Suez Canal or the Panama as far as making it possible or impossible to traverse.

General, without Diego Garcia are we unable to project long range patrol aircraft, to the extent required, in order to protect any U.S. Navy operating forces we may have there?

General BROWN. Definitely the answer would be yes, we would be unable to.

Senator GOLDWATER. In fact, there is no other base that you have for a land-based aircraft; is there? You know that since we do not have the use of airfields on the eastern shore of Africa and the littoral States, there are not many bases, if any, that we have left that we can launch land-based aircraft on; is there?

General BROWN. No, sir. We are restricted in the number of bases that will take land-based aircraft in that part of the world.

Senator GOLDWATER. How accessible is Berbera to the tanker ship lines of communications from the Persian Gulf to the United States?

General BROWN. Well, as you realize, Berbera is just a few hundred miles to the west of the main shipping line from the Persian Gulf around the east coast of Africa.

Senator GOLDWATER. If this is not classified, I would like to have you answer.

Is it not true that the Soviets are building another naval base east of the mouth of the Persian Gulf?

General BROWN. They are participating, as the Secretary testified in his statement, in the preparation of another base. Whether it is for their use or other use I do not know yet.

Senator GOLDWATER. Is it not true they are looking at still another site east of that?

General BROWN. I am not aware of that. I just do not know, Senator.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. There has been an intermittent use of facilities in Bangladesh and in India. We do not know the status or availability of those facilities.

Senator GOLDWATER. I am not talking about the immediate future. I think this was tied in with the ability of the Soviets to convince Afghanistan and Pakistan that it would be to their advantage to pay attention to the Soviets and forget about the free world, so to speak.

I think it is one of the major concerns of Iran, by the way.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator GOLDWATER. Is the naval base at Subic Bay, Philippines essential to the support of our operation at Diego Garcia?

General BROWN. Yes. The principal support of our fleet movements into the Indian Ocean is sustained in the main from the Subic Bay. Diego Garcia really will only be, even when this construction is completed, almost a satellite of Subic. The supplies will flow by ship and by air into Diego Garcia from Subic Bay in the main.

Senator GOLDWATER. If we are denied Subic Bay, and I really think it is fairly logical to assume that we may be, will we not also be denied the use of our air bases in the Philippines?

General BROWN. I can only speculate, and I would hope not, but I cannot see any reason to close us off from one base and not all bases.

Senator GOLDWATER. I admit that it is speculation, but from the comments of President Marcos a few days after the loss of South Vietnam, and his recognition of Peking yesterday, I think we have to do more than just speculate on this possibility. I think it is a very, very serious threat to the United States. I do not believe the Philippines any longer will look to the United States as a dependable, viable friend. I hate to say that, but I think we have to look at reality.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has used his time. Do you have one more question?

Senator GOLDWATER. I do not have any more. You have just run me out.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator McIntyre.

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, is there any particular reason for the U.S.S.R. ship-days presence in the Indian Ocean that is depicted on your chart in 1972, 1973, and 1974?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. As I indicated, there has been a steady expansion. The special reasons are shown by the dark area at the top of the curve which reflects the mineclearing operations in Bangladesh and the northern Red Sea. Those areas, of course, would represent a transitory phenomenon, and we would expect them at least to disappear.

Senator MCINTYRE. Are those mineclearing operations all over?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator MCINTYRE. You know, 170,000 barrels of POL is not a very significant amount of POL storage.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is what we see at the present time.

Senator MCINTYRE. Therefore, the question that was raised by my colleague, Senator Symington, seems to be very significant, that the installation at Berbera has 130,000, and they are going to 170,000 barrels, and for the modest installation that we are going to have at Diego Garcia, you are requesting something like 640,000.

Now what is the explanation for that?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think the explanations are twofold. The first is that Diego Garcia is located 5,000 miles away from Subic at best, as Senator Goldwater has indicated. There is no question about that. If Subic would not be available, you would have to operate at a very considerable disadvantage from the east coast of the United States. Our lines of communication are vastly longer than those of the Soviets. The Soviets' line of communication will shrink from 11,500 miles to 2,500 miles.

In addition, it is intended that we have the support facilities for a carrier task force which is a high consumer of fuel as compared to the ships of the Soviet Navy, the combatants, which are primarily missile carriers, are of much smaller dimension.

So I think that you have a different reason in the two cases, the length of the lines of communication and the type of capabilities that would be supported.

Senator MCINTYRE. We certainly have a longer distance to travel. There is no doubt of that. Are we going to lose our lease at Bahrain?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We certainly hope that that will not occur. At the present time that is still up for discussion.

Senator McINTYRE. But I am impressed by the fact that a number of these nations are interested in something that they want; they have something going and I have never seen it or how many signatories there are to it, but it is to try to establish that the Indian Ocean will be an ocean of peace. And yet, I understand that the reason we have got to further our position in the Indian Ocean is, No. 1, that we have got to keep those oil lines, the foreign oil, in a position where we can obtain it; and second, that we need to be in there as a superpower to oppose the challenge of another superpower in order to protect these little nations around the area there--where some say they do not really want, either us or the Russians there.

It just does not make any sense. It does not make any sense to me. I do not understand.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, it makes diplomatic sense, if I may put it that way. It may not make sense logically.

Senator McINTYRE. I am not satisfied that we have made the effort at the top to try to get some sort of an agreement with the Soviets as to the amount of activity that we are going to have to put on the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Vest has said that they turn a cold and a deaf ear; they are not interested, and that seems a shame. Here we are doing what Richard Russell, according to Mansfield, said we should never do. We are going to make it easier to get in the Indian Ocean; easier to float around there, and easier to get into trouble.

So it is a real problem to me. I somehow have the feeling that the case is being overstated. Mr. Secretary. I could not back that up with any testimony. I just do not have the time. But, you know, when I was a kid I started collecting stamps, and one of the first stamps that really interested me was a commemorative stamp put out by Great Britain and it was a map of the world, and down to the bottom it says "The Sun Never Sets on British Soil."

And here were all of these little places in red around the globe, and that is what happened. The Sun has set for Great Britain, and we have had to pick up the marbles. And believe me, there is a lot of resistance coming up to this, Mr. Secretary, a lot of resistance.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Bartlett.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, what is the nature of our agreement with Britain on Diego Garcia? How much time has to run, what position do we have?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Basically, it is a 50-year agreement for joint lease. There are some requirements for consultation with regard to specific types of use. In general, as to the purposes for which we intend to use the facility, there are no restrictions other than to inform them.

Senator BARTLETT. Is this similar to other agreements we have reached for bases of operation with other countries?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think it is similar to other agreements that we have reached with as intimate an ally as the British, and it is similar to some of the agreements we have reached elsewhere. Agreements cover a very broad spectrum, and some of them are quite restrictive; this is not.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, in your opinion, why are the Soviets building up their strength in the Indian Ocean and building up the base at Berbera?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I would like to stress that we cannot define precisely what the Soviet motives are. All that we do know is that there has been a growth of capability; the growth of capability does concern us, and we must counterbalance it.

Under the heading of speculation, one can talk about the warm water drive of the czars back to the time of Peter the Great. Or one may say that the Soviets have now become a global naval power and they wish to express that. Or one may suggest that they prefer to be astride the oil lines of communication with the implicit threat that that holds for the oil lines of communication.

I would not care to attempt to identify precisely what the Soviet motive is, it could be a number of things. We do note the capability, however, and that concerns us.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, does the rapidity of the buildup in Berbera, which seems to me to be rather fast, does that and any other reason indicate a further expansion of Berbera?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We do not know whether there will be further expansion beyond that which we have indications of from the high altitude reconnaissance.

Senator BARTLETT. In your opinion is this facility at Berbera primarily for naval activity or a combination of air and naval?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The very substantial airstrip indicates that maritime surveillance is one of the intentions of the Soviets. The missile support facility has the potential of supporting air-to-surface missiles as well as surface-to-surface missiles, so that in all probability it will have a substantial air presence as well as naval presence.

Senator BARTLETT. The Senator from Arizona asked you questions about other bases that the Soviets have, but trying to ask the question a little differently, how does this addition, with what they already have, including what they have in the Soviet Union itself, add to the total presence of the Soviets—including their ability to overfly other nations to the Indian Ocean?

Also, just what does this give the Soviets compared to what the United States has or what it would have with this addition at Diego Garcia?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. They have substantially greater capability for support of their vessels and their requirements because of the size of the vessels in their fleets. They are more modest than our own, and their lines of communication are shorter.

As a result, if it were their design, and they transited the Suez Canal, they could rapidly build up their presence in the Indian Ocean.

As Senator Symington has observed, in the event of conflict, the Suez Canal could indeed be closed. It is for that reason, I believe, that the Soviets will be interested in expanding their logistical capabilities in the Indian Ocean as a contingency.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator. Thank you.

Senator Culver.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Vest, in 1971 and 1973, the U.S. General Assembly passed resolutions calling for the establishment of an Indian Ocean zone of peace. I was concerned by your statement, therefore, that we have made no overtures to the U.S.S.R. regarding the Indian Ocean since 1971.

As the Senate demonstrated last week, we want specific evidence on the relationship of foreign policy to military force structure request and missions. Is this expansion at Diego Garcia related to specific foreign policy requirements? What commitments would be hindered if the Congress were not to take this action? Or have military desires for flexibility prevailed over foreign policy interests in maintaining friendships with nations in the area, in supporting U.N. calls for a peace zone and in building on détente, supposed détente, by seeking and initiating, not just awaiting proposals leading toward agreement for military limitations in that area?

I would just like to add to that question a followup to Senator Symington's about the attitude of countries toward this development in the littoral area.

In hearings before the committee on March 12, 1974, Deputy Secretary Clements was asked by Senator Symington to provide for the record a country-by-country analysis of the positions of the littoral nations regarding the proposed U.S. expansion of Diego Garcia. The results of that analysis are in the committee print of June 9, 1975, and they report a summary of those 29 countries conducted by our own Government which resulted in a finding that none of the 29 were favorable.

Supposedly balanced were four: Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, and Singapore. And interestingly enough, on Iran the report says: "Press reaction has been balanced, but expressed desire that a great power arms race in the area be avoided. There has been no official Iranian position, but our embassy believes the GOI would not object unless pressed for public position; if it were, it might have to express public regrets."

Unfavorable, 12; unknown, 13.

Is this another case of the tail wagging the dog, Mr. Vest?

Mr. VEST, Senator, let me say at once I do not consider that it is a matter of the tail wagging the dog. I think that there are specific policy reasons why we have favored Diego Garcia.

To begin, you must look at, we would look at the whole area. Our policy relationships to this whole area are dependent in the first place on freedom of the seas. We wish to maintain that freedom of the seas.

I go beyond that. Our relationship to the area is dependent on the balance. We wish to maintain that balance. Without that, there is no stability.

As far as the Indian Ocean zone of peace, which the resolution which you referred to speaks of, we oppose this very simply because it does involve the matter of the freedom of the seas. If we are limited in one area, we will find such an activity affecting us in other areas, and there are broad policy considerations calling for freedom of the seas, not simply the Indian Ocean but elsewhere as well.

As far as the countries themselves, I am familiar with the itemization you have mentioned. I would merely go back to my statement. There are a large number of countries there that for political reasons will say one thing publicly, but in private conversations, under the present circumstances, do wish to maintain a balance with the Soviets in the area.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Vest, how many times did you hear that during the whole agonizing course of our experience in Southeast Asia and Vietnam? Is that not a pretty painfully familiar refrain?

Mr. VEST. Yes, sir. But I am not saying it in that context.

Senator CULVER. You are saying it now in the context of a context, and you have not learned any of the lessons of the past 10 years.

Mr. VEST. Respectfully, sir, I disagree with you. I am talking about another area and I do not consider that I am repeating propaganda or shibboleths on this particular area, and I can go straight to Iran. You picked Iran. Of course Iran has said it would like third-party forces removed and that is their avowed ultimate objective. But there is a wide distinction between saying that and that the Shah would like our policy today to take actions that would leave him in a pre-judicial situation in relation to what he wishes ultimately.

Senator CULVER. Do we have any initiatives toward the Soviet Union in terms of concrete proposals emanating from our own Government to bring out a peaceful resolution of this situation and try to stem these disturbing and dramatic developments—that is, that have been described as dramatic developments today?

Mr. VEST. In this particular area, we have not.

Senator CULVER. You have not.

Mr. VEST. No, sir.

Senator CULVER. That has not changed either.

You mentioned Iran. There are two items in today's New York Times, one that reports of U.S. plans to sell Iran three diesel submarines, "To give the Iranian Navy the ability to operate in the Indian Ocean."

Then there is a second one headlined, "Persian Gulf States Seeking Closer Ties."

This is a report of increasing solidarity among the Persian Gulf states where Iran is seeking a gulf free of outside powers.

This article points out, Mr. Vest, that we have a continuing flow of armaments to our friends, our so called friends, the nations of the Upper Gulf region, including \$400 million in U.S. material, to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman alone during U.S. fiscal year 1975. Preliminary figures recently made available suggest Iran's disbursements for military equipment during the 12 months ended in March this year come to \$4.7 billion.

This report goes on to say that it is expected that in a collective security pact to be signed this fall, the signatories will guarantee each other's territorial integrity and keep the two superpowers away from the region.

In view of these developments, why does the United States need to police the gulf and the Indian Ocean?

Mr. VEST. Sir, we are not policing the gulf. We are maintaining our ability to be there. There is a distinction between the two.

Senator CULVER. Our ability to be in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. VEST. We are—

Senator CULVER. We have trouble being in the Indian Ocean today?

Mr. VEST. With Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, it makes it easier and more economic to carry out a function which we consider advisable.

Senator CULVER. Specifically, would this base be vital for a military contingency in Iran?

Mr. VEST. I do not specify that Diego Garcia is specifically designed for any area in the Indian Ocean.

Senator CULVER. It is just out there, an island, so why not have a navy base there?

It is not tied to any commitments, not tied to the implementation of any specific foreign policy objectives, just a vague thing that we have a rock, let's build something. We have an airplane that can take pictures of some place in the neighboring area, and we can manufacture all kinds of horror stories on the eve of congressional consideration, so why not muscle up and let the political types just roll along? We do not have to link that to any foreign policy objective. That is not really ever called for. Let us just escalate this situation and above all do not dare go into any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union, where we supposedly have all of these cozy relationships currently, to try to bring about restraints and save the American taxpayer and world peace. Is that your thinking? What do you do over there in that shop of yours? Wait until the Defense Department gives you your marching orders and try to figure out some half-baked rationale which you have not even offered today?

Israel—would this base be vital for military operations to defend Israel, Mr. Vest?

Mr. VEST. I turn that over to the—

Senator CULVER. No, I am asking you. You read that Constitution again. We have what is called civilian control of the military. Mr. Schlesinger's job is to respond to your judgment and determination in consultation with the President and the Congress as to what our foreign policy is. I am trying to find out from you what our foreign policy is, and I think it would be a great assistance to the Secretary of Defense. He has got a tough enough job with one hat, much less two.

I am asking you, would this base be vital for military operations to defend Israel and would this lack of a base prevent operations to defend Israel?

Mr. VEST. Senator, if you will let me answer your question, you have asked a military evaluation, and I think it is preferable to allow the military representative to answer your question.

Senator CULVER. I would like to hear what you think. Do you have an answer at all?

Mr. VEST. Sir, I have a personal opinion. I have not studied the strategic ability there, but I do not think Diego Garcia has a particular role to play.

Senator CULVER. Maybe I misunderstand your job description at the State Department. I understand that you are Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs. I cannot think of a more intimate nexus upon which to address a subject than the particular portfolio you carry.

Mr. VEST. I agree with you, Senator, but I thought it was appropriate to invite the responsible military authorities of this country to give their advice.

Senator CULVER. I am trying—

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the time has run over. In deference to other members—

Senator CULVER. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions, some to Mr. Vest and also to Secretary Schlesinger, and I would respectfully hope that we could have another full committee hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. We will get back to you just as soon as we can. We have a responsibility to the other members.

Senator Hart.

Senator CULVER. I understand that.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Schlesinger, a year ago the position of the intelligence community was, I think, strong and uniform that the necessity for the request here today was fairly minimal and that the possibility of a substantial Soviet presence in this area was, I think in Mr. Colby's words, the presence was relatively small and inactive, they kept a minimal force in the ocean, and the assessment at that time was that this was not a very important matter, and that the Soviet Union's presence did not necessitate any substantial change on our part. And I point to an exchange in hearings roughly parallel to these a year ago when my predecessor, Senator Dominick, is quoted as saying: "If we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we by doing so increase the force of the Russian fleet?"

And Mr. Colby at that time said: "I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area."

I take it from the remarks by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, that the CIA has changed its position. Is that the case, and could you explain why?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Well, let me start with the observation that there was no vast difference, in my judgment, between the positions taken by Mr. Colby and by the representatives of the Department of Defense. A selective reading of Mr. Colby's statement might have led to that conclusion. Mr. Colby said on that occasion, that the Soviet Union is likely to increase its continuous deployments there whether or not there is a substantial increase in U.S. Naval forces. Even if there is no substantial increase in U.S. Naval forces in the area, we believe that the Soviet increases will be gradual, say one to two ships a year.

The reference to the inactivity, of course, reflects the absence at that time of a logistical support structure which the Soviets are in the process, apparently, of repairing. So, I would not see the vast gap between what Mr. Colby said and what DOD spokesmen said at that time. But, I would emphasize the fact that there has been substantial change since last August, when Mr. Colby gave his previous testimony. The growth of the facility at Berbera, most of the earmarks of that have come in the period since November.

We live in a period of change in the Indian Ocean.

Senator HART. What increase in the number of combatant ships in the last 12 months has occurred?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that, as indicated, it is a variable thing; typically it has been increasing at the rate of one or two a year on a permanent basis, but there are variations.

Senator HART. An increase of one combatant ship a year, so there were eight last year and there are nine this year, and that is the basis—

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No; the basis for what we are talking about is a very substantial increase in the logistical developments of the Soviet Union in the area. The operations of the Soviet Union are approximately five times those of the United States, normally speaking. The suggestion—I will pause.

Senator HART. Is a ship-day of a mine sweeper equal to a ship-day of an aircraft carrier?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir, it is not.

That is why I mentioned the number of ships they normally deploy. They normally deploy about 19 ships, as opposed to our 3 ships stationed in the Persian Gulf. The change that you see, I think, is a change that does affect the security of the economies of all of the industrialized world, and I would be hesitant to be in a position in which the United States is not able to counterbalance the forces that the Soviets are increasingly bringing to bear.

This development has been going on the part of the Soviet Union since 1962. There is no indication that the Soviets have any plan other than to go on with this development.

Senator HART. This development you have cited, is a missile capability. What kind of missiles are those? What can they do?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The surface to surface missiles are antiship missiles designed presumably to sink other combatants, but they could be used against merchantmen or tankers. Air-to-surface missiles have an obvious purpose. The photo that I showed also indicated a bunkering area for warheads. Those would be high explosive warheads. At the present time, we see no possibility, no probability I should say, of nuclear warheads.

Senator HART. General Brown, are we members of the CENTO agreements?

General BROWN. We participate, but we have no defense or security commitment. We participate in the staff work and the meetings and discussions.

Senator HART. In that regard, then, I think at the top of page 3 of your statement, where it says that we are related to Iran and Pakistan through the commitments of the Central Treaty Organization, is not quite accurate.

We are not, in fact, legally related or committed to them.

General BROWN. I think the statement is accurate. I regret if the statement misled you into thinking that I was saying we were full partners of the Central Treaty Organization.

Senator HART. Well, in fact, I think something you said a few minutes ago suggested that also. We can look back in the record, but I think the strong suggestion that we have abiding international—

General BROWN. No. We have no security commitments as we have with NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder, please, General.

General BROWN. I say we do not have the same commitments in the Central Treaty Organization that we have in NATO, for instance.

Senator HART. At the top of page 5 of your statement, you talk about implementing a decision to act in the interest of the United States in this area. Could that or would that possibly include an invasion of any portion of the area, the Persian Gulf area?

General BROWN. No. I know of no commitment that would be binding on the United States to call for military action in the Persian Gulf.

Senator HART. I did not use the word commitment. I said could that phrase include that kind of an operation?

General BROWN. No, sir.

Senator HART. I do not know what you mean by implementing a decision to act in the interests of the United States.

What does that mean?

General BROWN. The *Mayaguez* incident is perhaps a case in point, an example of the type we have in mind.

Senator HART. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I have been constantly confused in these deliberations on the issue of quantity versus quality, and many of the weapon systems we buy are sold to the American people on the grounds that they are more cost effective than the Soviet Union's, they are more capable, that the nuclear-powered ships can steam more days without refueling, and we are going to have to rely less and less on foreign bases because the countries are going to be less willing to cooperate with us, and so forth and so on.

We buy these with the understanding that they have that capability, and, therefore, we would not have to have these reliances; and yet, we are still talking about expanding our bases in new places like the Indian Ocean, and perhaps the Marianas Islands, and so forth. And ship-days, which are apples and oranges as far as little ships and big ships, I am constantly thinking that we are shifting from quantity to quality and confusing the issue.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I agree entirely, Senator, that that is one of the most difficult problems to sort out.

If we have nuclear propulsion, then the bunkering requirements for the vessels declines. The requirements for aviation gas or jet fuel remains unaffected by nuclear propulsion, so one has to sort out those items.

I would emphasize we are not talking about constant or steady deployments into the Indian Ocean. We are talking about a small expansion of a facility that will provide us with the support capabilities in the event that they be needed, not any permanent deployment in the Indian Ocean for purposes of operationally counterbalancing the Soviets. This is a small insurance investment with regard to logistical capability.

The operational savings, for not operating out of Subic Bay, results in a small annual cost saving, which, over a period of years, will repay the initial investment.

Senator HART. If the Soviet Union—

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We are dealing with \$100 million, rather than vast expenditures.

Senator HART. If the Soviet Union increases their presence there, you would not want to increase ours?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It would depend upon the circumstances. We might, indeed. We do not know what the results would be in the deliberations in the Persian Gulf. We have, as I indicated, maintained two destroyers, and a command ship—currently an LSD—in the Persian Gulf since 1949. We have had a very substantial growth of permanently deployed Soviet forces without any growth of U.S. forces.

We would have to look to the future to see what the risks are in order to decide on such deployment prospects. But, it is not now our intention permanently to deploy ships into the Indian Ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but you have used up your time.

Take another minute.

Senator HART. Could I just make one request of Mr. Vest to supply the committee on a classified basis evidence to support his statement that the littoral nations do come in fact on a behind the scenes basis, want our presence there, other than just allegations of that?

[Classified response available in committee files.]

Mr. VEST. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Leahy, you are next, please.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for the fact that I had to miss part of your testimony. We were marking up part of the nutrition bill in the Agriculture Committee today, and I am also on that committee, and it was a guns and butter situation. I do apologize.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. You cannot buy much butter for the sum we are requesting today, Senator.

Senator LEAHY. Yes, but we could buy more than we could without the money.

I know that Senator Symington has raised some questions of the foreign policy problems involved here, and I must admit that I am concerned about those same problems. As I understand it our involvement with Diego Garcia is by an executive agreement and not by treaty. Is that correct?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is right.

There was a revision of the executive agreement in February of 1974.

Senator LEAHY. It seems that some of these major items tend to go by executive agreement, and other things, like fishing rights and what not, go by treaties. If, indeed, it is in the best interest from a foreign policy point of view of the U.S. Government to be in the Indian Ocean and in Diego Garcia, then the expenses that you are suggesting here are very realistic. But, Mr. Chairman, we have not had a discussion of the foreign policy questions and I would like to hear in more detail from the Department, from the State Department, as to just what our foreign policy interests are in that area.

As it is now, we operate carriers in the Indian Ocean, what—6 months of the year approximately?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have been there about 4 months of the year, one-third of the year in the past 12 months.

Senator LEAHY. If there are surface-to-surface missiles in Berbera, how vulnerable are these carriers to such surface-to-surface missiles?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that there are a variety of views on that, and on that question I would prefer to answer in executive session.

Senator LEAHY. Could we have some material?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, we can provide some material on a classified basis.

[Classified response available in committee files.]

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

The Soviet ships so far this year, I understand, are present at a lower annual rate than the last 3 years, 1972, 1973, and 1974. Is that correct, or am I misreading the chart?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think the rate is a little bit higher than it was previously. This is the first 3 months of this year, but these kinds of statistics, as Senator Hart has pointed out, are not necessarily conclusive. But excluding the mine clearing operations, it looks that over the period of those years, their presence is up rather than down.

Senator LEAHY. You say it is up?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is my recollection, based on number of port calls and that sort of thing.

Senator LEAHY. Has there been any suggestion publicly or privately in developing a base at Diego Garcia—perhaps I should rephrase that. Do we have any public or private discussions underway or in the past, with Iran in relation to our base at Diego Garcia, to eventually supply them with any kind of facilities at that base?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. And of course, it is a joint base, and that would require an agreement with the British under any such circumstances.

Senator LEAHY. Have there been any discussions with the British along those lines?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I believe the answer to that is no.

Mr. VEST. That is correct.

Senator LEAHY. Has Iran in any way broached the subject with us?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Not to my knowledge, and I have followed this very closely.

Senator LEAHY. If we expand, as you indicate, and the request indicates, what eventual expansion is planned for our Navy in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have no plans at the present time for expansion of naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. What we are providing here is a logistical base on which the development of task forces on an intermittent basis could be supported at lower costs than out of Subic Bay, and more efficiently. But we do not plan additional naval deployments at the present time.

Senator LEAHY. None have been planned? Have there been any contingency discussions, at least, as to what we might eventually build up to in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. On a permanent basis, no. There has been no discussion of that because there has been no intention to do so.

Senator LEAHY. How do we react to the statement made, for example, by Australia indicating very much of a reluctance to having us in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that we might have an executive session at some point to discuss the reactions, the diplomatic activity, that has taken place in this area about the entire problem, not only as it pertains to Australia.

Generally speaking, I would react to many of these statements in the following manner: that all of the governments in the area, when given an opportunity to support a profession of peace, will do so quite naturally.

ally, driven by political considerations, both international and domestic. The problem that one faces is that all of these statements about the zone of peace have taken place in the face of a fairly persistent Soviet increase of their capabilities in the Indian Ocean and have not affected those results. It is generally recognized that protests directed to the Soviet Union have no effect whatsoever; they do not influence the press of the Soviet Union or the parliamentary conditions in the Soviet Union. The only way that one can acquire political leverage is by directing such comments against the democracies in which one can acquire political and parliamentary and press leverage. Therefore, it is not surprising that the bulk of these objections are directed toward the prospective American bases as opposed to the bases that have been utilized by the Soviet Union over a period of years, one of which is a major undertaking.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with me, however, that the question is not by any means solely a military one, but must take into consideration some very, very substantial foreign policy questions?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Absolutely.

I would also state that it must take into account the underlying foreign policy questions as opposed to the surface questions. Talk is cheap, and various nations around the littoral have found it easy to make these statements, hoping privately that those statements will not be observed by the United States.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Secretary, I have no problem in agreeing with the military advantage of Diego Garcia. I have none whatsoever. I have no problem in seeing the advantages as a fueling station, an airstrip, and so forth.

My concern is, however, again, the whole foreign policy question. Do we want to be in the Indian Ocean at all? Frankly, I am quite concerned, Mr. Chairman; I am concerned that while we have to answer the military question in this committee, I am concerned that that whole foreign policy issue has not been debated at length.

I know Senator Goldwater and I have expressed concern at different times, and while Senator Goldwater and I may have different views as to what may be the foreign policy decisions on some of these questions, I really feel that it is impossible to make a solid judgment on something like Diego Garcia without the full debate on that foreign policy issue.

I am not trying to lecture you in any way, Mr. Secretary, not at all.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I agree entirely, Senator.

We have thought about the foreign policy issues, and in our judgment those foreign policy issues strongly argue in favor of this facility. In the longer run, if we were to observe the public professions of various littoral states on this issue, most of those states would regret our reactions under those circumstances, and observe that with our foreign policy position, given the enormous dependence that has developed on the part of all of the industrialized world on the oil resources of the Persian Gulf, we cannot afford to be relatively naked.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but your time is up. Would you phone the cloakroom and see if they would allow us to sit 15 additional minutes, please?

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I just would ask only——

The CHAIRMAN. One other question? Go ahead.

Senator LEAHY. No; I just want the material that is going to be submitted, the classified material. I suspect that I may have further questions that I would like permission to be able to submit subsequently.

The CHAIRMAN. Permission for what?

Senator LEAHY. To submit further questions after the submission of the classified material that we are going to be receiving.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right.

We will have to put some kind of a time limit, gentlemen, on these submissions. We have to report this back to the Senate under the agreement not later than June 18, which is a week.

Senator LEAHY. My time would be contingent upon the time that it takes to get their answers.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I will ask you gentlemen to get your material in on that, and ask unanimous consent that Senator Culver's questions be submitted in the record for answering. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

I am not going to take but a minute or two here gentlemen. We have a vote coming up by the way, for your information, at 1:30 according to this memo, final passage of the food stamp bill.

Gentlemen, just a word. I seldom make any arguments, but about the commitments, I learned rather early in life that you have a commitment to yourself to protect your own hide, and to look ahead and to prepare yourself. I think nations better follow the same rules.

In any thinking, I do not see the necessity for treaty or commitment where matters of these important areas that are so necessary to our economy and to include a large part of our present supplies of oil for the free world and our allies are concerned. I am not thinking in terms of taking oil. Not at all. The very opposite. I feel like it is clear that we ought to be somewhere around in that area of the world with some force in order not to have an empty gasoline tank.

I think that one word—o-i-l—is, after all, the most practical part of this matter from the standpoint of America, and the average America citizen.

When I was a new Member of the Senate—I will just illustrate one thing—in Western Europe for the first time in 1949, I believe it was, talking to a so-called minor official in one of the Scandinavian countries, he said that you people—meaning America—are acting in all good faith, but when you force all of the European nations out of the Pacific area, at the same time you are going to create a void over there, and other influences are going to come in and fill that vacuum, communism of one kind or another, and you people are going to have to defend against it, and most probably you will have to do it alone. I do not remember who the man was, I cannot remember for certain what country it was in, but it certainly did get my attention. Since then we have had the war in Korea, and I remembered what he said. Since then we have had the war in Vietnam, and I still thought about what that man said. I just bring it up now because I think it is highly relevant.

Senator Goldwater?

Senator GOLDWATER. I only have a short comment. Mr. Chairman.

Being conservative, I am always interested in history. I was a very young man in the 1920's and 1930's, but I am carried back to those days by what I am hearing in the Congress and across the Nation today. We paid no attention to the threat of Germany, we paid no attention to the threat of Japan, and we fought a world war. We paid no attention to the threat of Korea, and we paid no attention to the threat of Cuba, or of Vietnam, and we fought two more wars and got in trouble over another one. And now we are questioning whether or not the Soviets have any intentions.

My final comment is based on the statement made by my good friend from New Hampshire, Mr. McIntyre, who told us about the stamp that he bought once that says the Sun never sets on England. The Sun has set on England because England became weak, and I am sitting here wondering where the Sun is about now with the United States. It may be over the yardarm it may be too late. I hope not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some questions here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, if the Soviet Union has deployed a portion of its fleet in the Indian Ocean at the outbreak of hostilities, and the Suez Canal were subsequently closed, how far would the Soviet fleet have to travel in order to obtain necessary supplies such as ammunition, replacement parts, and so forth, and how does this compare with the distance which the U.S. fleets would have to travel say to Subic Bay in the Philippines or any other naval facility we may have closer?

Would you supply the answer to that for the record?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I can give you a rough approximation now, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just did not want to use up my time.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It is about 11,000 miles for the Soviet Union under those conditions to the Black Sea, or 8,000 miles to Vladivostok, and it is about 4,500 miles to Subic Bay.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, sir.

What plans does the Air Force have to operate airplanes from the expanded field at Diego Garcia?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We are planning to operate transport aircraft, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. That answers my next question also. Why is it necessary that the Air Force have ammunition storage on Diego Garcia?

General BROWN. It is a contingency requirement, and we have no plans to stock at the moment. We would only make provision for facilities to take stockage in the event that it was required.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think the next question had better be answered in executive session.

Last year, Mr. Secretary, there was an attempt made to place the money for Diego Garcia in the emergency supplemental, and the attempt was made to have the money in the regular appropriation

bill, and now the Department of Defense is asking for \$13 million more. Apparently you feel that the request for the facility on Diego Garcia is quite urgent?

Correct?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think it is very important.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, would you please detail the presence of the fleets of other nations in the Indian Ocean, and I am speaking particularly about India, Iran, Great Britain, France, Australia, and of course, particularly the Soviet Union?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. For the record?

Senator SYMINGTON. For the record.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

ATTACHMENT 1

AUSTRALIA

Navy : 18,115 active personnel.

4 Oberon-class submarines.

1 aircraft carrier.

3 ASW destroyers with Tarter SAM, Ikara ASW msds.

6 destroyer escorts with Ikara.

4 coastal minesweepers.

2 minehunters.

19 patrol boats.

2 fleet support ships.

7 landing craft.

Fleet Air Arm :

1 fighter-bomber sqn with A-4G Skyhawk.

2 ASW sqns with S-2E Tracker and 2 HS-748.

2 ASW helicopter sqns with Wessex 31B.

1 helicopter sqn with Iroquois and Kiowa.

1 trg sqn with Aermacchi MB-326H and 2 TA-4G.

(10 Sea King ASW hel for delivery in 1975.)

Reserves : 6,294.

ATTACHMENT 2

INDIA

Navy : 30,000 active personnel (including naval air).

1 16,000-ton aircraft carrier (ex-British).

6 submarines (ex-Soviet F-class).

2 cruisers.

2 destroyers.

22 frigates (3 GP with Seacat SAM, 3 AA, 7 ASW ; 9 ex-Soviet Petya-class ;

3 more GP building ; 1 more Petya-class on order).

8 OSA-class FPB with STYX SSM.

9 patrol boats (5 ex-Soviet Poluchat-class).

9 seaward defense boats (6 less than 100 tons).

8 minesweepers (4 inshore).

3 landing ships.

3 landing craft (2 ex-Soviet Polocny-class).

Naval Air Force : 1,500 active personnel.

38 Sea Hawk attack, 10 Alize MR ac ; 6 Sea King (10 Sea Hawk, 5 Alize and 2 Alouette can be carried in the aircraft carrier.)

ATTACHMENT 3

INDONESIA

Navy : 40,000 (incl naval air and 5,000 Marines) active personnel.

5 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class).
2 destroyers (ex-Soviet Skory-class).
7 frigates (ex-Soviet Riga-class).
18 coastal escorts (14 ex-Soviet, 4 ex-US).
9 Komar-class patrol boats with STYX SSM.
30 patrol craft.
5 fleet minesweepers (ex-Soviet T-43 class).
20 coastal minesweepers (6 ex-US).
17 MGB (ex-Soviet BK-class).
35 seaward defense boats (less than 100 tons).
4 HQ/support ships.
10 amphibious warfare vessels.
2 Marine brigades.

Naval Air : 1,000 active personnel.
6 C-47; 3 Alouette III and 4 Bell 47G hel (4 Nomad MR ac on order).

ATTACHMENT 4

PAKISTAN

Navy : 10,000 active personnel.

3 submarines (French Daphne-class).
1 light cruiser/training ship.
4 destroyers.
2 frigates (2 more on order).
7 coastal minesweepers.
9 patrol boats (6 Chinese Shanghai-class).
2 UH-19 SAR hel (6 Sea King on order).

Reserves : 5,000.

[Information on U.S.S.R. and France was furnished and is retained in committee classified files.]

Senator SYMINGTON. And the nature of the ships.

Mr. Secretary, when major combatant ships only are considered, how do the Soviet and the American forces in the Indian Ocean compare?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The Soviets have an edge, probably a substantial edge in terms of the forces permanently deployed. When the United States introduces a carrier, the balance shifts.

Senator SYMINGTON. What facilities do the British still use in the Indian Ocean, and to what extent?

Would you supply that for the record?

[The information follows:]

The British have RAF staging bases on Gan Island in the Maldives and on Masirah Island (Oman); they have a naval communications station on Mauritius and an agreement with South Africa for use of facilities at Simonstown; in the Singapore area they have a contingent of troops, patrol aircraft and periodic naval presence associated with the Five Power Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, they have a number of troops and seconded personnel in Oman. With the exception of their assistance to Oman, the British have announced as a result of their defense review of last

year to withdraw from all of these facilities by about April 1976. They will retain possession of the British Indian Ocean Territory, which includes Diego Garcia, and will maintain a small detachment at the US communications station there. We expect their naval deployments to the Indian Ocean to be reduced in the future below the present modest level. The British plan to reduce participation in SEATO and to withdraw all forces assigned to CENTO as part of this withdrawal.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know that they have other bases in the Indian Ocean, and how active is Iran in the Indian Ocean?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. It is relatively inactive, Senator, but its naval capabilities are growing. We will supply some additional information for the record.

[The information follows:]

Neither Iran nor Iraq currently maintains any naval presence in the Indian Ocean area. Iraqi naval activity has been confined exclusively to the Persian Gulf. Iranian naval activity is usually confined to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. Indian Ocean naval activity by both Iran and Iraq has been restricted to ship transits for delivery of new units or travel to foreign shipyards.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, if you would.

Have the Japanese self-defense naval forces used the Indian Ocean?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, is Pakistan being considered as an alternate location for a naval base if Diego Garcia is not approved?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. It is undoubtedly a possibility for consideration. We have not given any consideration to it up to this point.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the view of the Pakistani Government concerning—well, you have not given it consideration up to this point, so I withdraw that question.

Obviously the opening of the Suez Canal will enable the naval forces of the Soviet Union, as well as the naval forces of the United States greater access to the Indian Ocean during peacetime. It would appear in both cases a commitment of additional ships on the Indian Ocean would have to entail utilization of a portion of respective Mediterranean fleets, is that correct?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, with the limitation that most U.S. carriers cannot go through the Suez Canal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

While the Suez Canal would serve to make Soviet access to the Indian Ocean relatively a simple matter in peacetime, it also could serve in wartime as a barrier or a trap for a large portion of the Soviet fleets if the canal were sealed. Thus, would the deployment of a sizable portion of the Russian fleet into the Indian Ocean present a risk to them?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Undoubtedly, Senator. I think you implicitly put it very well in the question.

Senator SYMINGTON. In view of the obvious risks which the Soviet Navy would incur with a large deployment in the Indian Ocean, do you believe that the Soviets would substantially increase their naval forces in the Indian Ocean in preparation for a general war with the United States, or assuming their naval forces were already deployed there, that they would withdraw this from the area, withdraw their ships from the area before attempting to tackle the U.S. Navy?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Sir, I think that is a question that is very

dependent upon the scenario. With regard to a global war, I think they might conclude that a withdrawal might be desirable. With regard to a war of a different scenario, they might reach a different conclusion. So, I do not think you can have a hard, fast answer to that question.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to get into any counterforce discussion at this time, but I do look forward to discussing that aspect with you further.

I thank you for your answers, and General Brown, for your tolerance and understanding.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, on the question of getting additional time to meet, I think that is arranged all right, even though it has not been formalized. We will go into executive session on the request of any member or any witness, any of those three, as soon as we finish our questions.

Senator Leahy, that brings us back to you, sir.

Senator LEAHY. The only question I had, Mr. Chairman, was basically the same question that Senator Symington has regarding the Suez Canal.

I have nothing further.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that the underlying point that Senator Symington has expressed is that the Suez Canal reopening gives greater access; but in the event of serious conflict, it implies additional risks.

Senator LEAHY. Precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you wish to go into executive session, Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. No. There is going to be some material that is going to be supplied for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, gentlemen, we want to cover as much of this as we can now. We are all here together and all in good humor, and we will just cover as much as we can.

Of you three witnesses, do either of you wish to go into executive session?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. At this time, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, at this time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that is unnecessary, unless the committee wishes.

The CHAIRMAN. General Brown?

General BROWN. I feel the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vest?

Mr. VEST. Same way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On these charts, I did not see the one, and I was just out only a minute or two, showing the Subic Bay area on the same chart as Diego Garcia. Did you present that chart?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The world map has that on it, Senator. The stretch runs through the Strait of Malacca to Diego Garcia, which lies approximately 1,000 miles southwest of India.

The CHAIRMAN. I want one as large as that chart there is, just pointing out and bringing forward that distance there.

Another thing, on this Subic Bay matter, and anyone may leave who wishes, that is all right, on the Subic Bay matter, what rights do we have there?

I have been there. I know what a beautiful place it is and how essential it is to us. Is there any kind of special commitment to us, or on our part to them, regarding Subic Bay?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Of course, we have the general treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines. In addition, we have special treaty rights applying to both Clark Air Force Base and to Subic Naval Base, and we can specify those in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Those are stated in a positive form, and I wish you would put that response in the record.

As always, I let each witness have a chance to add any additional point or any observation that he might wish.

Mr. Secretary, do you wish to say anything further?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

I would make two brief observations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The first was the question of Senator Russell's statement of a decade ago. I believe that Senator Russell, were he alive at the moment, would without question support the necessary protection and the military measures to provide use with security in an area of the world on which the further of the entire industrialized community depends. I have no question that he would see now that it is now in our interests to be in the Indian Ocean, as opposed to a decade ago, when our interest in the Indian Ocean was far narrower.

Second, and related to that, Senator Symington mentioned a sound economy. A sound economy for the industrialized world will depend upon a continued growth of imported oil. Without the security for that flow of oil, the soundness of that economy comes into question.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Brown, do you have anything?

General BROWN. I have nothing to add, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vest?

Mr. VEST. Nothing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not make any comment on this statement attributed to Senator Russell, but I am not going to sit idly by if that thing becomes an issue. I knew him and I knew him very well.

All right, gentlemen, we thank you for your testimony.

We will take a recess, subject to the call of the Chair, and we do want copies of those charts that we can put into our record, if necessary. We also have some questions left by Senators Thurmond and Culver which we would like inserted into the record at this point, and answered by you gentlemen.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

[Questions submitted by Senator Thurmond. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.]

Question. General Brown, what is the present position of the government of Thailand on our use of Utapao Air Base to fly P-3 patrol flights to the Indian Ocean? Assuming there was no objection by the Thai government, are operations from Thailand to cover the Indian Ocean practical?

Answer. The Thai Government has made it clear that our use of Utapao Air Base is dependent upon our service of mutual interests. We do regularly, with Thai approval, conduct supply operations from Utapao to Diego Garcia. It is

approximately 2100 miles from Utapao to the center of the Indian Ocean. Under normal circumstances this approximates the operational radius of a P-3 operations in the entire Indian Ocean from Utapao.

Question. General Brown, assuming the go-ahead on Diego Garcia is received, under what conditions do you visualize B-52 or KC-135 aircraft using the facilities?

Answer. The only possible use of Diego Garcia for B-52s would be as an emergency landing facility. The runway is neither strong enough nor wide enough for B-52 operations. KC-135s would be used either to refuel other aircraft, particularly surveillance aircraft, or in a surveillance role themselves.

Question. General Brown, how does the opening of the Suez Canal impact on the requirement for Diego Garcia?

Answer. The opening of the Suez Canal facilitates Soviet deployment into the Indian Ocean reducing the transit distance for Soviet reenforcement and resupply by about 8000 miles. It may be expected that they will increase their presence as a result of the added capability. It is likely, however, that the Suez Canal would be closed in the event of a major conflict. It is in the U.S. national interest to be able to balance Soviet capability in the Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia is important to our capability.

Question. Mr. Vest, why is the Indian Ocean and what the Soviet Union does there important to our national interests?

Answer. As you know, the US is not a power that has come lately to the Indian Ocean area: our long association with that region dates back to the time when our domestic shipping first began to participate in world commerce. Although we have traditionally had more important interests in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean areas, we have also long been active in the Indian Ocean area.

We are quite conscious of the Soviet Union's aspirations to project its power into distant areas, both politically and militarily. A sizable USSR naval presence in the Indian Ocean is now an established fact. The naval ship presence of the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron has continued to increase, highlighted by significant participation in a recent world-wide exercise.

The US also has important interests in the area, and I would summarize this necessarily complex matter in the following way: We share with the enormously varied countries on the littoral of the Indian Ocean a common desire that they tackle their many problems in a context of peace and tranquillity. We, too, have an interest in their choosing peaceful means for the resolution of disputes. We are interested in assisting in the development of these countries, and are pleased to see forward movement in economic development and toward political stability.

In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area through the Indian Ocean is essential to the economic well-being of much of the world, especially to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. Clearly, it is in our interest that the vital sea lines of communication over which this oil flows remain open to all nations.

In addition to oil, we have other important commercial and economic interests in the area. We do substantial trade with several states of the region, and opportunities continue to grow. Our air routes crisscross the region. Our merchantmen ply between ports in the area.

Our periodic deployments to the Indian Ocean reassure our friends in the area, and serve as a reminder that we are able to respond to threats against our interests and those of our allies. We firmly believe that an effective capability to deploy and support US naval forces in the Indian Ocean area helps to deter attempts to disrupt the vital sea lines of communication which traverse it, and also underscores the importance we attach to the right of all countries to navigate freely on the high seas. These deployments also highlight the flexibility and mobility of our military posture, thereby demonstrating the efficiency and effectiveness of our forces in a wide variety of circumstances and enhancing their deterrent credibility. We believe the periodic demonstration of our ability to operate in the Indian Ocean reinforces our diplomatic efforts to maintain stability in the region, and in contiguous areas such as the Middle East.

Question. Mr. Vest, have any of the Indian Ocean littoral states asked for the United States to increase its presence there?

Answer. Strictly speaking, no. However, several of the littoral states privately—and a few publicly—have indicated they recognize that our maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean area is a significant influence for stability.

Question. Mr. Vest, what is the position of the following countries relative to the U.S. and Diego Garcia:

- a. India;
- b. Pakistan;
- c. Bangladesh;
- d. Burma
- e. Sri Lanka;
- f. Saudi Arabia; and
- g. The East Africa littoral states.

Answer. The official public reactions of India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have been unfavorable. Pakistan has taken a more balanced position. Burma and Saudi Arabia, so far as we know, have not made authoritative public comments relating specifically to our Diego Garcia expansion proposal. As for the East African states, Somalia and Tanzania have reacted unfavorably, while Kenya's reaction has been balanced. We know of no specific reactions from Ethiopia or Mozambique.

Question. Mr. Vest, to the best of your knowledge, how have these countries expressed themselves on the increasing presence of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. The above-listed countries have supported the U.N. resolutions calling for the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from all military bases, installations, and supply facilities of *all* the great powers, as well as from any manifestation of great power military presence conceived in the context of great power rivalry. However, of the governments that periodically and publicly comment on these matters, most castigate our presence more often and more pointedly than that of the Soviets.

Question. Mr. Vest, what steps are the United States taking with the Soviet Union to reduce mutual military presence in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. We believe that the readily-apparent growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of their own perceived national interests, rather than as a reaction to U.S. force levels and/or facilities presence as such. We do not believe the steps that we are proposing will contribute to an arms race in the Indian Ocean. There is no intention to station operational units permanently on Diego Garcia. Nor would the proposed expansion there necessarily imply an increase in the level of U.S. deployments.

We have taken no formal, specific steps with the U.S.S.R. to reduce mutual military presence in the area since the unproductive 1971 exchanges with which you are familiar. Nevertheless, we have stated on several occasions that we remain open to constructive suggestions on this matter.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CULVER

[Questions submitted by Senator Culver. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.]

Question. Mr. Secretary, what specific foreign policy commitments will be served by this planned expansion on Diego Garcia? Put another way, what specific commitments would be substantially hindered if we do not approve this expansion?

Answer. There are no specific foreign policy commitments, in the sense of formal treaty obligations, which will be served by this planned expansion on Diego Garcia. We do believe, however, that it is important to the U.S. national interest that we have the capability to support a U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean area in order to demonstrate our interest in the stability of the region and our concern for the continued freedom of navigation on and over the high seas of the area. While these are national interests, not specific commitments, disapproval of the expansion would deprive us of a more efficient, economical, and effective capability to support U.S. naval deployments to the area in furtherance of our interests.

Question. Would this base be vital for military contingencies in Iran?

Would deployment of forces for Iran be hindered substantially if we did not expand Diego Garcia?

Answer. The proposed expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia is not directed specifically at any particular military contingency. Rather, it is intended to provide the assurance of U.S. capability to deploy and maintain forces in the Indian Ocean area should the need arise. The lack of such facilities would be a

serious blow to our ability to maintain a credible balance in the region, and as such it would substantially affect our ability to respond to requirements affecting U.S. national security interests.

Question. Would this base be vital for military operations to defend Israel?

Would lack of this base prevent operations to defend Israel?

Answer. As indicated in the previous response, the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia would enhance U.S. capability to respond to the requirements of U.S. national security in the Indian Ocean, and its absence would seriously affect our capability. Additionally, it should be noted that our increased presence in the Indian Ocean in the form of intermittent deployments to augment our limited permanent presence was initiated following the events of October 1973, and our request for an expansion of Diego Garcia dates from the same period. The preservation of a stable situation in the area south and east of Suez is clearly related to our objectives of peace and security in the Middle East.

Question. Is this base essential for military operations to secure oil supplies from the Persian Gulf?

Given the global capabilities of the US Navy, could we not protect the sea lanes without Diego Garcia?

Answer. We have been maintaining an augmented presence in the Indian Ocean approximately one-third of the time over the past twelve months. These forces must rely either on local sources for necessary fuel and maintenance or else must be replenished by a chain of tankers stretching over 4,000 miles from US facilities in the Philippines. The additional facilities we have proposed at Diego Garcia would permit a normal carrier task group to operate for about 30 days independent of other sources of supply, a margin of time which could spell the difference between the orderly resupply of our forces in a contingency situation or a hasty improvisation which could place unwieldy demands on our support assets in other areas. In short, the facilities proposed for Diego Garcia are essential to maintain a US capability to operate forces in an efficient and effective manner in the Indian Ocean. However, this capability is not directed at any specific contingency, as indicated above.

Question. Since Britain retains sovereignty over Diego Garcia, can you assure us that the British will have no veto power over the use of Diego Garcia in the contingencies specified?

If that question is not resolved, will the Congress be informed of any British veto rights whenever a treaty governing Diego Garcia is submitted to the Senate?

Answer. We have worked out acceptable language, *ad referendum*, for US-UK government-to-government and service-to-service executive agreements. These have not been finally approved but, essentially, we have agreed to consult periodically on objectives and developments in the Indian Ocean area. We have also agreed that we would inform each other about usage of the facility in normal circumstances. Usage in other than normal circumstances would be a matter for joint decision. As was pointed out earlier, this agreement is similar to other agreements we have reached with as intimate an ally as the British.

Question. At one time it was argued that this base would be used for KC-135 tankers which could refuel B-52s from Thailand. Since B-52s have now been withdrawn from Thailand, what use does this base still have?

Is this the opening wedge in a planned expansion in the Indian Ocean, or will this limited expansion be sufficient?

Do you still agree with the Defense Department answer given to Senator Hughes in 1974, that: "The improvement plan for Diego Garcia would provide austere facilities capable of supporting up to a carrier task group, which would more than offset an increase of Soviet presence by 50%."?

If this is the only major US facility in the Indian Ocean, wouldn't it be highly vulnerable in the event of military operations for which you claim it is essential?

Answer. Although the expanded facility at Diego Garcia will permit the operation of KC-135 tankers, refueling of strategic aircraft was never identified as the principal purpose of the facility. Testimony by the Secretary of Defense and many other representatives of the Department of Defense have identified

the relative capabilities of such a US force and the Soviet naval force in the Indian Ocean, since the Soviet presence changes radically at various times. For example, in late 1971 the USSR had a total of 26 ships in the area in response to the Bangladesh crisis including a cruiser, three destroyers, and two submarines armed with cruise missiles. At the present time, the Soviets have seventeen ships in the area, including eight combatant ships of which two are guided missile destroyers.

In this age of strategic missiles, virtually all installations are vulnerable. However, the location of the island of Diego Garcia approximately a thousand miles from the nearest land, means that it would best be defended by US naval and air forces in the region, which is the type of force it is designed to support.

Question. The British have announced their plans to pull out of their bases in Gan and Mauritius. Do you plan to move into those installations?

At one time, I believe, it was argued that a major US presence in the Indian Ocean required bases on the Farquhar and des Roches Islands as well as Diego Garcia.

Is that the opinion of the Defense Department?

If so, are we planning to have such facilities?

Answer. The answer is no, on all counts.

Question. Last year, Navy witnesses claimed that the opening of the Suez Canal would enhance Soviet capability for deployment into the Indian Ocean. Do you agree?

Couldn't the U.S. Sixth Fleet also use the Canal?

Would a prudent Soviet planner realistically assume that the Canal could be used for military operations in the Indian Ocean?

What rules now govern the use of the Canal by military ships?

Is it not significant that the only military ship to participate in the Suez reopening was the flagship for the US Sixth Fleet?

Answer. As indicated earlier, we anticipate that with a newly reopened canal we will see an increase in the level of Soviet merchant ship traffic and commercial activity with South Asia. We will be watching very carefully for any change in the pattern of Soviet naval deployments. The opening of the Canal reduces the distance from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea from 11,500 miles to only 2,500 miles—a difference in sailing time of 24 days. It also reopens to the USSR a warm water transit route from European Russia to the Soviet Far East, which will undoubtedly be important for the transfer of naval units between eastern and western fleets. Whether this will mean an increase in Soviet naval presence on a regular basis is not certain, but it definitely will increase Soviet flexibility in supporting or reinforcing its units in the Indian Ocean.

US forces can and will use the Suez Canal. However, in its present configuration, the Canal is not large enough to permit the transit of any but our two oldest carriers.

Any prudent planner would have to take into account the fact that the Canal has previously been closed during periods of conflict, and this could happen again.

The Canal is open to the warships of all nations except Israel, to the best of our knowledge, on the basis of a routine request.

The participation of the USS *Little Rock* was indeed significant and was welcomed as a gesture of Egyptian friendship and appreciation for US assistance in reopening the Canal.

Question. Do you agree with the testimony by CIA Director Colby last year that: "Our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area?"

If so, what have we to gain by this expansion?

Answer. Mr. Colby also expressed his view that even in the absence of an increase in US forces, the growth of the Soviet naval presence would continue, and he also noted that the Soviets have "a certain interest in posing a possible counterthreat to the oil resources of Western Europe." As pointed out earlier, it is difficult to ascribe recent Soviet activities in Berbera as a reaction to an increase in US presence, particularly when the evidence indicates that they were planning the construction of a missile facility in Berbera even before October 1973 when the US began more frequent deployments to the area. We would prefer to see no Soviet buildup in the region, but since they have apparently decided to undertake such a buildup, we believe prudence requires us to have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence.

Question. Why is it necessary for expanded US military presence since our "friends" are buying so much in armaments?

After all, 42 percent of our foreign military sales went to nations in the Persian Gulf in 1967-74, and in 1974 were 60 percent.

Answer. A number of nations in the Indian Ocean area are improving their military capabilities. None of them, however, could at this time be considered to have a credible military capability in comparison with a nation such as the Soviet Union.

SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SYMINGTON

[Questions submitted by Senator Symington. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.]

Question. Please list the names of all ports in the Indian Ocean area to which ships bearing the U.S. flag have paid calls during 1973, 1974, 1975.

Answer. Listed below are the names of Indian Ocean ports to which U.S. Civilian Flag vessels have paid visits from 1973 to 15 June 1975.

	<i>Country and port</i>
Bahrain :	Sitra Island ; Minasulman.
Bangladesh :	Chalna ; Chittagong.
Diego Garcia :	
United Arab Republic :	Port Suez
Afars & Issas :	Djibouti.
Ethiopia :	Assab ; Massawa.
India :	Bombay ; Calcutta ; Cochin ; Kandla ; Madras ; Mangalore ; Quilon ; Visakhapatnam.
Iran :	Bandar Abbas ; Bandar Mahshar ; Banda Shapurr ; Kharg Island.
Jordan :	Aqaba.
Kuwait :	Nina Al Ahmadi ; Kuwait ; Menasaud ; Shuaiba.
Kenya :	Mombasa.
Mozambique :	Lorenco Marques ; Mozambique Port ; Nacala ; Beira.
Pakistan :	Karachi.
Malagasy Republic :	Tamatave.
Qatar :	Umm Said ; Halul Island.
Reunion Island :	
Sri Lanka :	Colombo ; Tricomalee.
Saudia Arabia :	Dammam ; Jiddah ; Ras Tanura.
South Africa :	Durban ; East London ; Port Elizabeth.
Sudan :	Port Sudan.
Tanzania :	Dar Es Salam ; Tanga.
UAE :	Abu Dhabi ; Dubai ; Das Island ; Jebel Dhanna.
Yemen :	Modeidah ; Makha.
South Yemen :	Aden.
Oman :	Muscat ; Quoin Island.

Question. List the names of all ports in the Indian Ocean area to which ships bearing the Soviet flag have paid calls during these years?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. List the names of all ports in the Indian Ocean area to which U.S. Combatant ships have paid calls during these years.

Answer. Listed below are the names of Indian Ocean Ports to which U.S. Naval ships have paid calls during 1973, 1974, and 1975.

Country	Port	1973	1974	1975
Afars and Issas.....	Djibouti.....	X	X	X
Bahrain.....	Dammam.....	X	X	X
	Bahrain.....	X	X	X
	Diego Garcia.....	X	X	X
Ethiopia.....	Assab.....	X	X	X
	Massawa.....	X	X	X
Indonesia.....	Surabaya.....	X	X	X
Iran.....	Bandar Abbas.....	X	X	X
	Bandar Shapur.....	X	X	X
	Kharg Island.....	X	X	X
Kenya.....	Mombasa.....	X	X	X
Kuwait.....	Kuwait.....	X	X	X
Malagasy Republic.....	Diego Suarez.....	X	X	X
Maldives.....	Male.....	X	X	X
Mauritius.....	Port Louis.....	X	X	X
Mozambique.....	Lourenco Marques.....	X	X	X
Muscat/Oman.....	Khor Kuwai.....	X	X	X
Pakistan.....	Karachi.....	X	X	X
Reunion.....	Reunion.....	X	X	X
Saudi Arabia.....	Jidda.....	X	X	X
Seychelles.....	Victoria.....	X	X	X
Sri Lanka.....	Colombo.....	X	X	X
Union of Arab Emirates.....	Abu Dhabi.....	X	X	X
Arab Republic of Egypt.....	Dubai.....	X	X	X
Yemen.....	Port Suez.....	X	X	X
	Hodeida.....	X	X	X

Question. List the names of all ports in the Indian Ocean area to which Soviet combatant ships have paid calls during these years.

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Are there any Soviet naval combatants permanently homeported in Berbera?

Answer. There are no Soviet naval combatants permanently "homeported" at Berbera. There is, however, one Soviet naval auxiliary in the form of a barracks/repair ship that was towed there over 2 years ago and remains there today.

Question. Are there any yard facilities in Berbera for major ship repairs?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Does the Somali government still retain ultimate control over port facilities at Berbera?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Is Soviet access to all port facilities in Berbera unrestricted?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Can Berbera be considered a Soviet overseas base, as compared to a port facility which it uses though does not own?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. For the U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S., and France, list ports available to each where fuel can be obtained in the Indian Ocean today. Indicate any bases manned and utilized by the nations in the above group in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. Noncombatants (oilers), and in many cases combatants, can obtain fuel at these ports as indicated:

Port and availability to four nations

Pakistan : Karachi	All
India :	
Bombay	All
Calcutta	All
Cochin	All
Kandla	All
Madras	All
Mormugad	All
Port Bradip	All
Quilas	All
Vishakapatnam	All
Sri Lanka :	
Colombo	All
Trincomolee	All
Bangladesh : Chittagong	All
Burma : Rangoon	All
Indonesia (Indian Ocean coast) :	
Telukbanjar (Sumatra)	All
Benoa (Bali)	All
South Africa :	
Durban	All
Capetown	All
Simonstown	All
Port Elizabeth	All
Mozambique :	
Beira	All
Lourenco Marques	All
Tanzania : Dar-es-Salaam	All
Kenya : Mombasa	All
Malagasy : Diego Suarez	All
Mauritius : Port Louis	All
Iran :	
Abadan	All
Bandar Abbas	All
Bahrain	All
S. Yemen : Aden	Not U.S.
Kuwait :	
Ash Shuaybah	All
Ash Skuwaykh	All
Mina al Ahmadi	All
Saudi Arabia : Ras Tanura	All
United Arab Emirates (Dubai) : Mina Rashid	All
Oman : Mina al Fahl	All
French Territory of the Afars and Issas : Djibouti	All
Iraq :	
Basrah	U.S.S.R. only
Umm Qasr	U.S.S.R. only
Al Fau	U.S.S.R. only

Bases that are manned and utilized by the various nations are shown below:

U.S.S.R. : Berbera, Somalia.

U.S. : Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory.


France : Diego Suarez, Malagasy Republic; Djibouti, French Territory of Afars and Issas; Reunion Island; Comoro Islands.

United Kingdom : Gan Island, British Indian Ocean Territory; Mauritius Island, British Indian Ocean Territory.

Question. Do we now use Diego Garcia in any way in support of current air reconnaissance missions in the Indian Ocean area?

Answer. Maritime patrol aircraft use the airstrip at Diego Garcia while in the Indian Ocean in support of our naval forces there.

Question. Provide charts for calendar years 1973, 1974 and 1975 to date showing the comparative naval presence in the Indian Ocean Area of the United States, the U.S.S.R., France and the UK using the following format:



[Classified answer in committee file.]

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CULVER

[Questions submitted by Senator Culver. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.]

Question. Besides the construction at Berbera, has the U.S.S.R. in the past year expanded or reduced its base capabilities elsewhere in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. Besides the construction at Berbera, it is believed that the U.S.S.R. in the past year has not, from a naval standpoint, expanded or reduced its base capabilities elsewhere in the Indian Ocean.

Question. There is a table on page 146 of the fiscal year 1975 hearings on Military Construction by the Senate Armed Services Committee which shows access to Indian Ocean countries by United States and Soviet Navy units. This table shows United States access to 18 countries, Soviet to only 13. If the facts presented in this table have changed in the past year, please explain.

Answer. There are no changes in the facts presented in the table.

Question. Since the Somali Foreign Minister's June 11 invitation to visit Berbera, have representatives of the U.S. Government endeavored to make such a visit? If not, why not? If so, what were their findings?

Answer. We understand that Senator Culver has separately addressed this question to the Secretary of State by letter. Senator Culver will be answered directly by the Department of State.

Question. List all locations outside the Warsaw Pact where the U.S.S.R. has missile support facilities in being or under construction comparable to Berbera (or something similar).

Answer. There are no known locations other than Berbera, where the Soviets have similar missile support facilities.

Question. Has the U.S.S.R. stored antiship missiles at any of these sites? In what approximate numbers at each site?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. How does the missile storage capability at Berbera compare with the number of antiship missiles which would be carried with the typical carrier task group which the United States would routinely deploy to the Indian Ocean?

Answer. The United States has no operational antiship missile similar in any way to the surface-to-surface missiles.

Question. The Associated Press reported on June 12 that the U.S.S.R. may be seeking use of port facilities at Mozambique. What evidence on this matter is available to the U.S. Government?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. In the event of United States involvement in military action in the Indian Ocean area, would we be able to deploy significant forces without the availability of one or more of the following: bases in Thailand; additional bases in the Indian Ocean; trans-African overflight rights?

Answer. Yes, assuming of course the continued development of Diego Garcia.

Question. Since 85 percent of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean is said to be limited to the Gulf of Aden area, how useful a counterweight is a United States presence at the distant island of Diego Garcia?

Answer. The limited United States presence planned for Diego Garcia will not *per se* be a counterweight to the Soviet activities. However, that presence if expanded would provide the capability to effectively deploy such forces as are necessary or appropriate to provide such a counterweight.

Question. How capable against current Soviet forces in the area are the forces of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. How capable against Soviet forces are those of the French in the Indian Ocean?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. There is a table on page 146 of the fiscal year 1975 hearings on Military Construction by the Senate Armed Services Committee which shows access to Indian Ocean countries by US and Soviet Navy units. This table shows US access to 18 countries, Soviet to only 13. If the facts presented in this table have changed in the past year, please explain.

Answer. There are no changes in the facts presented in the table.

Question. Besides the construction at Berbera, has the U.S.S.R. in the past year expanded or reduced its base capabilities elsewhere in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. Besides the construction at Berbera, it is believed that the USSR in the past year has not, from a naval standpoint, expanded or reduced its base capabilities elsewhere in the Indian Ocean.

Question. The chart on Indian Ocean ship days presented to the committee shows Soviet activity through 31 May of 3,048 ship days. Since this works out to a lower annual rate (approximately 6500/year) than in the previous 3 years, is this significant?

Answer. The annual rate for 1975 would be 7,366 rather than 6,500 (average 20.2 ships per day through 31 May). Excluding the special mineclearing operations in Bangladesh and the Red Sea, this figure is larger than 1972 and 1973, but marginally smaller than 1974. The somewhat larger figure in 1974 is due to the unusually large Soviet presence in the months following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Question. The classified reply on Soviet missiles in Berbera says that these missiles were first observed on [deleted]. But a *New York Times* article on April 7 reports that Defense Department officials said that the U.S.S.R. was stockpiling missiles at Berbera. What evidence was there prior to [deleted] to support such claims?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. In view of the response to my question on the role of other bases, such as the Farquhar and des Roches Islands, is it correct to assume that the United States has rejected the alternatives for expanding the US presence in the Indian Ocean as outlined in the December 1968 study of US Base Requirements in the 1970s by Gen. Robert J. Wood's Special State-Defense Study Group?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. Do we still have a deployment objective of [deleted].

Are we ruling out for the foreseeable future the military need for any additional bases in the Indian Ocean?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR TAFT

(Questions submitted by Senator Taft. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. Given that Europe is far more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf than is the United States, should countering Soviet influence in the Gulf be an American or a European responsibility? Have we explored the European attitude on this? If so, please describe such explorations and their results. Are we simply insuring that Europe will not act, by making it clear we will go ahead and do it for them? Could we at the minimum have Europe share the cost of building the base at Diego Garcia? Have we explored the possibility of a joint European-American squadron for the Indian Ocean? If not, why not?

Answer. It is true that the European nations are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than is the United States. However, the direct U.S. interest in this oil is significant. At the present time, direct U.S. imports of oil from that area are greater than 20 percent of all U.S. crude imports. Moreover, if indirect imports are added—i.e., petroleum products originating in the Persian Gulf but which are imported into the United States after an intermediate stop in some other nation for refining or other purposes—the total is much higher. In 1974, for example, a total of 26 percent of all U.S. petroleum product imports could be traced to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Government does discuss these matters with European nations on a regular and continuing basis in a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. In particular, the United States and United Kingdom hold periodic meetings approximately every six months (most recently in May 1975 on political-military matters of mutual interest involving the Indian Ocean). Through this and other mechanisms, the United States maintains close coordination with Great Britain on Indian Ocean and related activities.

Despite their announced drawdown of military forces East of Suez, the British will retain an RAF staging base on Masirah Island and will continue periodic naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. The existing communications facility on Diego Garcia is a joint facility with the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom provides by Agreement the real estate on which it is constructed at no rental cost to the U.S. Government. The French also maintain a significant permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, which normally consists of about nine combatants and sixteen non-combatant units. We have not specifically explored the possibility of a joint European-American squadron for the Indian Ocean; however, operational information on ship movements is routinely shared with allied forces operating in the area. The United States and United Kingdom both contribute naval forces to the semi-annual exercises under the aegis of CENTO—most recently, in Exercise MIDLINK in November 1974—and exercise activity is conducted routinely with both French and British forces on an opportunity basis.

Question. What is the European presence in the Indian Ocean now? Could you provide a comparison of Soviet, French, and British ship-days in the Indian Ocean for each year since 1970? Also, please provide a comparison of aircraft carrier ship-days for each of the powers named. Do not the French have naval base facilities in this area?

(Classified answers available in committee file.)

Question. What is the significance of the French decision to go to nuclear power for their new aircraft carriers, in terms their future operations in the Indian Ocean? Could it be a signal as to their future intentions to operate in this area?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Are there not facilities in the area which would be adequate in an emergency, such as Simonstown? Please provide a description of alternate basing and fueling possibilities in the Indian Ocean.

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Are we building a base without a fleet to commit to it? Do we not now have to draw down the Pacific fleet to a dangerously low level to provide a task force for the Indian Ocean? Are we stretching ourselves too thin by attempting to create a fleet in the Indian Ocean—creating additional commitments that go beyond our military capabilities?

Answer. There are no plans to establish a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Over the past year a major surface combatant or an aircraft carrier from the Pacific fleet has been deployed to the area of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea approximately one-third of the time. We expect to continue such periodic deployments using ships from the Pacific fleet, from the Atlantic Fleet, or from the Sixth fleet in the Mediterranean. The proposed facilities at Diego Garcia would support these periodic deployments or any other deployments of ships or aircraft into the area. Rather than a drawdown of other fleets, our analysis indicates that the expanded facilities at Diego Garcia will ease the need for support ships (oilers, ammunition ships, etc.) during deployments.

Question. Is any force in the Indian Ocean really a bluff, in terms of the vulnerability of the tanker traffic to hostile submarines?

Answer. No. The intent is to maintain a visible support capability to deter conflict. We have little doubt that we have the capability to seek, identify, and destroy enemy submarines to a manageable level in the event of conflict.

Question. Could not the combined British, French, and Italian fleets assemble a squadron sufficient to counter the existing and near-term projected Soviet capability in the Indian Ocean, while still meeting their existing commitments?

(Classified answer available in committee file.)

Question. Please comment on the following alternative to the current plans for Diego Garcia: Building more naval tankers to enable any Indian Ocean Squadron to have adequate refueling capability without Diego Garcia. How many new tankers would be required? At what total cost?

Answer. Sustained operations of a single carrier task group in the Arabian Sea would require one oiler using Diego Garcia or two oilers using Subic Bay, Philippines, in the case of an embargo similar to that experienced during the Yom Kippur War. The 30-year life cycle cost of the additional oiler, considering a backup factor consistent with overseas homeporting, would be about \$500 million (fiscal year 1976 dollars), which includes more than \$100 million as investment costs. Much of this cost differential is also applicable in the case of nuclear powered carrier task group operations because of the requirement to provide aviation fuels. While the additional oiler would not be required during periods when alternative fuel sources are available, it would also represent a substantially smaller (120,000 bbl. versus 640,000 bbl.) quantity of fuel immediately available in theater in the case of a sudden oil embargo.

Moreover, the presence of a fixed support installation provides unmistakable evidence to all interested parties of U.S. ability to support combat forces in the Indian Ocean. Without such an installation, more frequent peacetime deployments of combatants utilizing mobile logistics support could be needed to provide comparable evidence.

Question. Please comment on the following alternatives to the current plans for Diego Garcia.

Make our development of Diego Garcia contingent on European participation, either in the form of sharing the cost for and use of the facility, or in the form of agreeing to send a joint European-American squadron into the Indian Ocean at periodic intervals.

Answer. We believe that the level of US interests in the Indian Ocean fully justifies the modest investment which has been proposed for the expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia. Of the two European nations which maintain a military presence in the Indian Ocean, the British already share the Diego Garcia facilities with us and contribute to them by providing the necessary real estate and some personnel, while the French have long-established communications and support facilities of their own in Djibouti and elsewhere. The established liaison channels which are routinely maintained with other friendly nations operating in the area have proven quite satisfactory in the past without the establishment of a more formal commitment, and we believe that such channels will provide an adequate framework for coordination and cooperation in the future.

Question. Given that Europe is far more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf than is the United States, should countering Soviet influence in the Gulf be an American or a European responsibility? Have we explored the European attitude on this? If so, please describe such explorations and their results. Are we simply insuring that Europe will not act, by making it clear we will go ahead and do it for them? Could we at the minimum have Europe share the cost of building the base at the Diego Garcia? Have we explored the possibility of 2 joint European-American squadron for the Indian Ocean? If not, why not?

Answer. It is true that the European nations are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than is the United States. However, the direct US interest in this oil is significant. At the present time, direct US imports of oil from that area are greater than 20% of all US crude imports. Moreover, if indirect imports are added—i.e., petroleum products originating in the Persian Gulf but which are imported into the United States after an intermediate stop in some other nation for refining or other purposes—the total is much higher. In 1974, for example, a total of 26% of all US petroleum product imports could be traced to the Persian Gulf. The US Government does discuss these matters with European nations on a regular and continuing basis in a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. In particular, the US and UK hold periodic meetings approximately every

six months (most recently in May 1975 on political-military matters of mutual interest involving the Indian Ocean). Through this and other mechanisms, the US maintains close coordination with Great Britain on Indian Ocean and related activities.

Despite their announced drawdown of military forces East of Suez, the British will retain an RAF staging base on Masirah Island and will continue periodic naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. The existing communications facility on Diego Garcia is a joint facility with the UK, and the UK provides by Agreement the real estate on which it is constructed at no rental cost to the US Government. The French also maintain a significant permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, which normally consists of about nine combatants and sixteen non-combatant units. We have not specifically explored the possibility of a joint European-American squadron for the Indian Ocean; however, operational information on ship movements is routinely shared with allied forces operating in the area. The US and UK both contribute naval forces to the semi-annual exercises under the aegis of CENTO—most recently in Exercise MIDLINK in November 1974—and exercise activity is conducted routinely with both French and British forces on an opportunity basis.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene upon the call of the chair.]

○